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2 The waters of the Third Pole
[1] The purpose of this report is to open up a dialogue 
on an issue that could put the lives and livelihoods 
of millions of people at risk in the foreseeable future. 
This issue is water – water as a vital resource and as 
a potential crisis driver in the Hindu-Kush Himalaya 
(HKH) region. In seeking to foster that dialogue, 
the report has three specific objectives: [i] to survey 
various types of potential water-related hazards and 
crisis drivers that could affect the region; [ii] to foster 
new types of alliances – including greater attention 
to what will be called humanitarian policy-maker/
science dialogues – for addressing the threats that 
the region may face; and [iii] to propose first steps 
that must be taken now to lead to prevention and 
preparedness measures commensurate with the 
nature and scale of threats facing the region. 
The importance of the HKH region  
as a water source
[2]  The HKH region, referred to by some as the Third 
Pole because it contains the largest area of frozen 
water outside the polar regions, is the source of 
ten major river systems that together provide 
irrigation, power and drinking water for 1.3 billion 
people – over 20% of the world’s population. As 
Section 1 notes, this regional water system is already 
under considerable stress and could be involved 
in future crises encompassing disputes over dams 
and river diversions, floods, water shortages and 
contamination. 
[3]  From Afghanistan in the west, through Pakistan, 
India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan to Myanmar 
and China in the east, the HKH region extends 
3,500km over eight countries and is the source of 
ten major Asian river systems, including the Ganges, 
the Brahmaputra and the Yangtze, Mekong and 
Yellow rivers. However, the region is susceptible to 
high levels of climate warming, earthquake activity, 
extreme weather events, glacial melting and relative 
sea-level rise. The region’s glaciers, rivers, wetlands, 
grasslands and coasts are all therefore affected.
[4]  Despite the uncertainty surrounding projected 
changes, it seems highly likely that many of the 
changes already observed will continue in future 
decades. Warming in many parts of the region is 
likely to continue and it is probable many glaciers 
will continue receding. Rainfall and extreme events 
such as storms and floods are likely to increase 
throughout much of the HKH region. The apparent 
increasing variability in the summer monsoon 
rains, coupled with the unsustainable use of water 
resources, may increase the probability of more 
severe drought during dry seasons.
Human activity in the HKH region 
[5] Large, fast-growing and rapidly urbanising 
populations, described in Section 2, are placing 
heavy demands on water and related environmental 
resources. Governments in the region are working 
to increase agricultural productivity and electricity 
generation, but with likely devastating effects on the 
environment. Longstanding antagonisms between 
countries and sub-regions are being exacerbated by 
disputes over increasing demand for diminishing 
or increasingly variable water resources. There 
are growing numbers of environmental migrants. 
These include both those people moving away from 
drying or degraded farmland or fisheries, and the 
millions displaced by ever-larger dams and river-
diversion projects.
Vulnerabilities and crisis drivers
[6] The main natural hazards in the HKH region are 
earthquakes, mass movements, extreme weather, 
windstorms, droughts, floods and wildfires. 
Groundwater contamination is also a major concern. 
As outlined in Section 3, the impacts of all of these 
may be magnified by environmental and climatic 
changes, population growth, globalisation and 
increasing demands on resources; and all in various 
ways dramatically affect water availability and are 
affected by water as a crisis driver. Consequently, 
such hazards, particularly those relating to water 
quantity and quality, are likely to continue to 
hamper socio-economic development and poverty 
reduction in the region, and could contribute to 
a range of humanitarian crises, from conflict and 
mass migration to famines and cataclysmic floods. 
Humanitarian perspectives
[7]  There is much that remains uncertain and unknown 
about potential humanitarian threats across the HKH 
region. Yet, at the same time, as reflected in Section 
3, there is ample expert opinion to suggest that the 
region offers a plethora of humanitarian threats that 
could severely affect the lives and livelihoods of 
millions of people. While this report is not intended 
to comment on the science that underpins those 
expert views, Section 4 of this report does suggest 
that in light of new and traditional types of crisis 
drivers affecting and affected by water, those with 
humanitarian roles and responsibilities need to 
develop new approaches to crisis prevention and 
preparedness. 
Summary
3[8]  To date, there is a general belief that too little 
attention is being paid to the region as an inter-
related system, that short term-ism dominates 
the thinking of too many governments in the 
region and that too many gaps in knowledge and 
information-sharing are constraining the planning 
and action essential to meet the types of crises that 
the region may well have to face in the future.
Conclusions
This report attempts to point out risks that need to be 
considered when dealing with what has been defined 
as the region affected by the waters of the HKH region. 
While recognising the abundance of initiatives that have 
already been undertaken in the region by governments, 
research organisations and community-based 
organisations to deal with many aspects of potential 
future threats, this report nevertheless concludes that 
there are issues which must be recognised and addressed 
as soon as possible:
P	 The HKH region is already in a state of crisis, 
affecting many vulnerable people. While there are 
indicators throughout the region that humanitarian 
crises are already taking place, their impacts on and 
implications for the region are all too often ignored, 
handled in geographic or sectoral isolation or not 
adequately understood
P	 Threats in the future. A growing number of experts 
in and outside the region are concerned about the 
region’s prospects over the next two decades. They 
see the dimensions and dynamics of water-related 
crises increasing significantly 
P	 Intensification of insecurity. In a region already 
sadly familiar with conflict, further conflict could 
result from the natural and human-made pressures 
facing the HKH region over the next twenty years. 
Water in this instance will be a significant factor
P	 Development catastrophes. This report 
emphasises the nexus between natural hazards 
and human intervention. It has been suggested 
that the development initiatives being undertaken 
throughout much of the region could lead to crises 
that will readily deserve the epithet ‘catastrophes’
P	 Lack of effective water management. There is 
inadequate long-term water management at almost 
every level in the HKH region. At national and 
international levels, water management is marked 
by short term-ism and solutions that lack sectorally 
integrated approaches
P	 Lack of systems perspectives. One factor which 
continues to inhibit a proper understanding of 
the region is the failure to adopt a systems perspective 
of regional issues. Only in this way will the scale 
necessary to deal with the longer-term threats and 
means to offset them be identified
P	 Knowledge gaps and lack of understanding. There 
is no adequate shared understanding about the 
region as a whole, no ‘map’ of potential risks and 
opportunities that would serve as a useful planning 
instrument. It is evident that there are considerable 
uncertainties in the HKH region. 
P	 Lack of coordinated, comprehensive research. 
While there are considerable pools of research on 
various aspects of the HKH region, data gathering 
and interpretation have been carried out without 
cohesion or continuity. There remains a great deal of 
academic and policy research that is uncoordinated 
and carried out by organisations without 
the institutional capacity to support effective 
information exchange
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Recommendations
The recommendations that follow are intended 
to suggest ways to strengthen humanitarian crisis 
prevention and preparedness activities in a region that 
may become increasingly vulnerable to large-scale water-
related disasters and emergencies:
P	 HKH region to move up the planning agenda. In a 
world in which the types, dimensions and dynamics 
of humanitarian threats will increase exponentially, 
the attention given to the potential vulnerabilities 
of a region which is home to 20% of the world’s 
population has to increase
P	 Need for a new planning construct. The 
complexities which will underpin so many of the 
crisis drivers that may affect the region require 
a new planning construct, or, framework. The 
proposed construct will have to have four core 
components: [i] vulnerability needs to be the main 
focus; [ii] a regional approach to vulnerability 
mapping; [iii] greater integrated modelling of the 
interactive nature of future threats; [iv] preparedness 
planning based upon futures scenarios
P	 Need for non-intrusive means for international 
support. Given the highly complex and politically 
sensitive nature of potential future crisis drivers 
in the region, humanitarian intervention from 
traditional humanitarian organisations will have 
to be less intrusive, and more able to support 
local and regional prevention, preparedness and 
response capacities. This would include [i] creation 
of humanitarian professionalisation programmes 
for sharing best practices and standards; [ii] means 
for regular sharing of data on regional dimensions 
of vulnerability; [iii] regionally-developed scenario 
exercises to assess and test appropriate approaches 
for international support for regional crises; [iv] 
pre-response arrangements between relevant 
regional bodies and international counterparts
P	 Foster cross-regional humanitarian policy-
maker/science dialogue. Measures are needed 
to promote essential policy-maker/scientist 
dialogue, including: [i] greater sharing of scientific 
information amongst countries in the region; [ii] 
accessible forum – including online capacities- for 
policy-makers to interact with natural and social 
scientists; [iii] proposed forum’s focus to give 
attention to interactive nature of possible regional 
threats; [iv] practical results of dialogue to be 
made accessible to threatened communities; [v] 
strengthened scientific and humanitarian research 
capacities in the region
P	 Promote innovation consortia. Linked to the 
previous recommendation, a forum to help 
identify, prioritise and implement scientific and 
technological innovations to offset potential 
humanitarian threats. Of particular importance in 
this context is to work with local communities to 
identify innovative solutions that directly relate to 
local needs
P	 Address knowledge gaps and coordination for 
comprehensive research. The numerous knowledge 
gaps touched upon in this and related studies need 
to be closed, and so it would be timely to bring 
together leading sectoral and regional experts 
to establish a prioritised programme of essential 
futures-oriented analyses to narrow knowledge gaps 
where possible. This initiative has to focus not only 
upon knowledge gaps within the region, but also 
upon those gaps in understanding about the ways 
that global issues, e.g. subsidised agriculture, that 
could impact upon the region’s vulnerability
P	 Vulnerability mapping exercise. A platform for 
developing a regional mapping exercise and system 
is required to identify and monitor those factors 
that could create humanitarian crises at local and 
regional levels. With an established platform, the 
mapping exercise in the first instance will need to 
focus on how such factors interact, their dynamics 
and probable dimensions of impact.
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More than one in five people, including the populations 
of Bangladesh, China, India and Pakistan, depend to 
some degree on water from rivers originating in the 
Hindu-Kush Himalaya (HKH) region. This region is 
sometimes referred to as the Third Pole because it hosts 
the largest expanse of frozen water outside the polar 
regions. Its drainage basins are one of the world’s most 
dynamic, complex and intensive risk hotspots. Further, this 
highly active geologic and climatic zone is subject to the 
growing socio-economic demands of some 1.3 billion 
people, and is a region of considerable human conflict. 
The supply and quality of water in this region is under 
extreme threat, both from the effects of human activity, 
and from natural processes and variation. Many parts 
of the region are already experiencing the first signs of 
serious water stresses. 
If the predictions for population growth, climatic 
variation and the demands of agricultural and energy 
in the region are correct, the present stresses may well 
seem relatively minor in years to come. Concerns about 
future water stress in this region are by not new. There 
is a burgeoning literature from a growing number 
of research institutes and fora that testify to the array 
of existing and emerging natural and human-driven 
hazards in the region. And yet, despite the attention that 
scientists, humanitarian and development policy-makers 
have given to such threats from their own institutional 
perspectives, there has been little attempt to look 
holistically at the inter-relationships and dynamics of 
such hazards as major crisis drivers.
This report suggests that more consistent and coherent 
efforts are needed to focus upon the dimensions and 
dynamics of potential threats in the region, including 
the ways in which hazards will inter-relate and interact. 
Without this research focus and planning perspective, 
the ability to mitigate future humanitarian crises 
that may directly and indirectly affect the lives and 
livelihoods of hundreds of millions, will be severely 
impaired. 
Sources of survival – sources of threat offers a particular 
perspective on crises in a regional context. The analysis 
focuses on the theme of water and looks at the interplay 
between natural and human phenomena that could 
threaten the lives and livelihoods of substantial numbers 
of people in this major region of the world. This report, 
however, is not intended to predict or forecast what 
will be, nor is it designed to contribute to the complex 
scientific debate that surrounds issues of climate 
change, meltwater, recharge rates and precipitation. 
Rather based upon literature reviews and interviews 
with scientific and disaster management experts in and 
outside the region, it suggests possible scenarios that 
should alert organisations with humanitarian roles 
and responsibilities to future planning challenges and 
opportunities. Its contribution should be seen in terms 
of exhorting humanitarian organizations to undertake 
more futures-oriented planning, to think more 
speculatively about what might be.
In this context, the report has three specific objectives. 
P	 It intends to survey potential water-related hazards 
and crisis drivers that could well affect the region 
in the foreseeable and longer-term future. The 
combination of “the knowns” with informed 
speculation is intended to help policy-makers, 
planners and practitioners think creatively and 
practically about what might be. It is in this sense about 
planning from the future.1 
P	 The report seeks to promote new types of alliances 
for addressing the threats that the region may face. 
Such alliances include a greater focus on humanitarian 
policy-maker/science dialogues.
P	 More broadly, the report highlights a concern 
that the level of attention given to the region’s 
vulnerability is not proportionate to the scale of 
the threat. There are therefore essential first steps 
that must be taken now to close the gap between 
prevention and preparedness measures and the 
nature and scale of the types of threats facing the 
HKH region. 
The	context
The main natural hazards in the HKH region, identified 
in Section 1, are earthquakes, extreme weather, 
windstorms, droughts, floods, mass movements, 
wildfires and natural contamination. The impacts of all of 
these may be magnified by environmental and climatic 
Introduction: planning from the future
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changes, population growth, globalisation and increasing 
demands on resources. Consequently, natural hazards, 
particularly those relating to water quantity and quality, 
will continue to hamper socio-economic development 
and poverty reduction efforts in the region, and could 
contribute to conflict. The distribution and volume of 
water and its sediment load may change dramatically 
in the future if predictions of climate change and 
population growth and development are correct.
The rivers that flow from the Himalaya provide water 
to at least 20 per cent of the world’s population.. 
These rivers flow through some of the poorest, most 
densely populated and intensely irrigated areas in 
the world. Hundreds of millions of people depend to 
some degree on this natural water supply for drinking 
water, power generation and agriculture. If this water 
supply is significantly altered through, for example, 
climate change, this could threaten the lives as well as 
the livelihoods of the region’s inhabitants. Section 1: The 
importance of the HKH region as a water source outlines key 
influences affecting water in the region.
A fully integrated systems approach is essential to the 
understanding and appropriate management of water 
in the vast HKH region. This requires definition and 
quantification of the components of the system and 
the linkages and feedbacks between them. Without this 
holistic perspective, the gross mismanagement of the 
system that is already in evidence will continue and 
worsen. To avoid this countries in the region will need 
to put aside their differences and communicate to share 
knowledge and data. This will require a new era of 
collaboration and trust, which could also contribute to 
the diffusion of regional political tensions. 
When seeking to understand the full consequences of 
HKH region phenomena, planners and policy-makers 
too often become fixated on borders, defining issues 
within boundaries and ignoring the cross-border 
implications of natural and human events. In the 
context of the HKH region, this would be a deeply 
flawed perspective. In this report, Section 1, The importance 
of the HKH region as a water source, identifies the main 
characteristics of the region as an integrated and inter-
related system, albeit one spanning more than 3500 
kilometres. 
The HKH region also offers important insights into the 
sorts of crisis drivers that can result from the interaction 
of natural phenomena and human intervention. Section 2, 
The people of the HKH region discusses some of the human 
dimensions of the region, including demographic trends, 
food security, potable water, energy and industry. This 
prepares the way for Section 3, Emerging vulnerabilities and 
future crisis drivers. 
Prediction and forecasting is not the ultimate purpose 
of this exercise. Nevertheless, Section 4 offers insights on 
possible dynamics and dimensions of future crises which 
though speculative seem at the same time plausible. This 
section argues that these sorts of perspectives need to be 
taken into account by those responsible for humanitarian 
prevention and preparedness as well as response.
This report also has another purpose. There is little 
doubt in the minds of a large number of experts who 
have reflected on the HKH region that the sorts of crisis 
scenarios emanating from the region and reflected in this 
report are possible though not inevitable. At the same 
time, there are serious unknowns about a region that has 
been described as a blank or ‘white spot’ for data on a 
‘Himalayan scale’. The need to focus on these unknowns, 
on the what might be’s, from a humanitarian perspective 
is becoming increasingly urgent, and this is but one of 
the ideas presented in the final section, Conclusions and 
recommendations.
A	common	ecosystem
‘…large water management projects have created social, ecological, and economic problems, the 
repercussions of which cannot be immediately gauged. For instance, China has initiated massive 
infrastructural projects in Tibet, where many major Asian rivers originate. Industrialisation upstream 
in China has led to soil erosion, deforestation, and landslides, whose impacts are felt in the lower 
riparian states of Bangladesh and India. That these countries are part of a common ecosystem was 
made tragically clear by the flash floods that ravaged northeast India in 2000 caused by a landslide in 
Tibet.’ 2
7The Hindu-Kush Himalaya (HKH) region extends some 
3500km from Afghanistan in the west to Myanmar and 
China in the east, and runs through Pakistan, Nepal, 
India, Bangladesh and Bhutan. It includes the Tibetan 
Plateau and is the source of ten huge Asian river systems: 
the Tarim (Dayan), Amu Darya, Indus (including Sutlej), 
Ganges, Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo–Brahmaputra), 
Irrawaddy, Salween (Nu), Mekong (Lancang), Yangtze 
(Jinsha), and the Yellow (Huang He) (see Figure 1). 
The drainage basins of these rivers cover an area of 8.6 
million square kilometres, which is equivalent to the 
size of Brazil, and provide water for an estimated 1.3 
billion people, or around 20% of the world’s population 
(see Table 1). In total, around 3 billion people directly 
and indirectly benefit from the water, food and energy 
provided by the river basins that originate in the HKH 
region. For ease of reference, the HKH region will be 
defined in this report as the HKH region mountain 
ranges (marked green in Figure 1) and the river systems 
of which they are the source (marked blue in Figure 1).
Geology,	water	and	land	use
The HKH region is one of the most geologically active 
zones on Earth. Through the process of plate tectonics, 
the Himalaya have been forming over the past 55–65 
million years through the collision of the Eurasian 
and Indian plates. Most of the mountain elevation has 
occurred during the past 2 million years and the world’s 
largest mountains (see Figure 2) are still growing and 
remain a highly active geological zone today. This zone 
has the highest relief and rate of uplift anywhere, and 
an extremely high incidence of earthquakes (see Figure 
3). Around 15% of the great earthquakes (magnitude 
8 and above) in the twentieth century were located in 
this region.3 The upper reaches of the Indus and Yarlung 
Tsangpo-Brahmaputra rivers run along the Indus-
Yarlung suture zone, which marks the interface of the 
Indian and Eurasian plates.
Figure	1:		The	ten	major	river	basins	of	the		
HKH	region	
Note: The HKH region as defined by ICIMOD (www.icimod.org/?page=43). The 
region extends from 58–122°E and 9–43°N. Downloaded 7 August 2009.
1 The importance of the HKH region  
 as a water source 
Figure	2:		Topographic	images	of	the	world	and	of	southern	Asia
Note: The lowest elevations are purple, medium elevations are greens and yellows, and highest elevations are orange, red and white. Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission 
and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) Global Digital Elevation Model (GDEM) image released 29 June 2009 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and 
Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and industry (METI), and downloaded courtesy of NASA and METI.
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Table	1:	Characteristics	of	the	ten	major	river	basins	originating	in	the	HKH	region	
Amu	Darya Brahmaputra Ganges Indus Irrawaddy Mekong Salween Tarim Yangtze Yellow TOTAL
River basin 
area (km2)
534,739 651,335 1,016,124 1,081,718 413,710 805,604 271,914 1,152,448 1,722,193 944,970 8,594,755
Countries in 
river basin
Afghanistan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan
China, India, 
Bhutan, 
Bangladesh
India,  
Nepal, 
China, 
Bangladesh
China, 
India, 
Pakistan
Myanmar China, 
Myanmar, 
Laos, Thailand, 
Cambodia, 
Vietnam
China, 
Myanmar, 
Thailand
Kyrgyzstan, 
China
China China
Mean discharge 
(m3/sec)
No data 19,824 18,691 5,533 13,565 11,048 1,494 146 34,000 1,365 105,666
Glacial melt in 
river flow (%)
No data 12.3 9.1 44.8 Small 6.6 8.8 40.2 18.5 1.3
Forest cover 
(%)
0.1 18.5 4.2 0.4 56.2 41.5 43.4 0.0 6.3 1.5
Grassland, 
savanna and 
shrubland (%)
57.3 44.7 13.4 46.4 9.7 17.2 48.3 35.3 28.2 60.0
Wetlands (%) 0.0 20.7 17.7 4.2 6.3 8.7 9.5 16.3 3.0 1.1
Cropland (%) 22.4 29.4 72.4 30.0 30.5 37.8 5.5 2.3 47.6 29.5
Irrigated 
cropland (%)
7.5 3.7 22.7 24.1 3.4 2.9 0.4 0.6 7.1 7.2
Dryland area 
(%)
77.8 0.0 58.0 63.1 4.4 0.8 0.1 38.6 2.0 79.4
Urban and 
industrial area 
(%)
3.7 2.4 6.3 4.6 1.9 2.1 0.5 0.3 3.0 5.9
Loss of original 
forest cover 
(%)
98.6 73.3 84.5 90.1 60.9 69.2 72.3 69.3 84.9 78.0
Population 
(thousands of 
people)
20,855 118,543 407,466 178,483 32,683 57,198 5,982 8,067 368,549 147,415 1,345,241
Population 
density (people 
per km2)
39 182 401 165 79 71 22 7 214 156
Large cities 
(>100,000 
people)
9 6 11 11 6 9 1 1 9 9 72
Water supply 
per person in 
1995 (m3 per 
year)
3,211 1,700–4,000 1,700–
4,000
830 18,614 8,934 23,796 754 2,265 361
Degree of river 
fragmentation
High Not reported Not 
reported
Not 
reported
Not 
reported
Medium Not 
reported
High Medium High
Number of 
dams in basin: 
>15m and 
>150m high 
(and those 
>60m under 
construction)
6, –, (2) –, –, (3) –, –, (5) –, –, (0) –, –, (0) 4, 0, (3) 4, 0, (1) 0, 0, (0) 63, 4, (38) 40, 3, (7)
Source: Compiled from the data of Jianchu et al. (2007), and references therein, and Revenga et al. (2003), plus ICIMOD (2007).
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Such is the size, elevation and climate of the HKH region 
that it hosts the largest areas of glaciers, snow and 
permafrost outside high latitudes, which is why it has 
become known by some as the Third Pole. These huge 
reservoirs of frozen fresh water represent the sources of 
a number of the world’s greatest rivers, and so the Third 
Pole region is often described as the ‘water tower of 
Asia’.
The fertility and productivity of the region’s river valleys 
and deltas, and of the world’s oceans, are influenced 
by the geology and climate of the HKH region. The 
mountains are so high that they strongly influence 
regional climate and weather patterns, and the action of 
ice, water and wind sculpts the mountains and valleys 
into their spectacular forms. The rivers have steep, cold 
and dry upper catchments, and flatter, hot and mostly 
humid lower catchments. The rate of weathering and 
erosion of the growing mountains is one of the highest 
in the world, and this is why huge volumes of sediment 
and dissolved minerals are produced and transported 
downstream to the great river plains, deltas, and 
adjoining oceans (see Figure 4). 
The rivers are vital to the sediment and nutrient balance 
of the lower catchments and of the world’s oceans. Large 
volumes of sediment are deposited in the broad and 
flat lower stretches of the river basins by downstream 
transport and flooding. These alluvial deposits are both 
porous and permeable and act as huge underground 
reservoirs of fresh water. They are recharged annually, 
mostly by meltwater from glaciers and precipitation 
associated with the Asian summer monsoon. Similarly, 
the processes of sediment transport and deposition occur 
throughout the year, but are most pronounced during 
periods of extensive rainfall and flooding associated with 
the monsoon.
The distribution of land type and land use varies 
significantly between river basins, but cropland is 
important in most of them (see Table 1). The large rural 
populations are mostly located in the vast flat and fertile 
river valleys and deltas. In Bangladesh, for example, 
population density exceeds 500 people per square 
kilometre along the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers, 
particularly in the mega-delta created by the coalescence 
of these two great rivers.
All the main rivers originating in the HKH region are fed 
to some degree by glacial meltwater, which accounts for 
a maximum of 40–45% of the river flow in the Indus 
and the Tarim, for example. The proportion of glacial 
melt in river flows is predicted to increase, as glaciers 
in the HKH region, except those in the Karakoram 
area, recede.4 Increased melting may initially increase 
the volume of water in rivers, which might lead to 
more widespread flooding, but as glaciers recede and 
disappear the amount of meltwater entering rivers could 
decrease significantly. Such a situation may result in a 
substantial decline in the rates of groundwater recharge 
in some areas. This, in combination with variations in 
summer monsoon precipitation and surface water flows, 
may lead to highly significant water stress in many 
parts of the HKH region and associated river basins. For 
example, the gross per capita water availability in India 
is predicted to decline from the 2001 volume of around 
1820 cubic metres per year to about 1,140 cubic metres 
per year in 2050.5 To place these numbers in context, the 
UN defines “water scarcity” as a per capita availability of 
Figure	4:	False-colour	Landsat	image	of	the	
Ganges	river	delta,	showing	sediment	flow
Note: The green colour represents the swamp forest of the Sunderbans, and the 
purple reflects the vast amount of sediment being transported out into the Bay of 
Bengal. Image taken on 28 February 2000, courtesy of NASA.
Figure	3:	Earthquake	risk	in	Asia	
Note:  The map shows seismic hazards estimated terms of peak ground 
accelerations with a 10% chance of exceedance in 50 years (Zhang et al., 1999). 
The site classification is rock. Downloaded from www.seismo.ethz.ch on 4 August 
2008.
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less than 1,000 cubic metres per year and “water stress” 
as less than 1,700 cubic metres per capita.6 
Climate	influences	and	impacts
During the latest phase of mountain building, about 
40,000 years ago, the Himalaya experienced an ice age 
when the glaciers grew and sculpted the mountains 
into their present dramatic forms.7 Subsequently, as the 
climate has warmed and the glaciers have shrunk, glacial 
lakes have formed and grown. Under the arid desert 
conditions to the north of the mountains the glacial lakes 
have evaporated to leave huge salt deposits, which the 
Tibetans mine for export to India. Groundwater in many 
of these arid northern regions is saline. Elsewhere the 
climate is much more humid, especially in the southeast. 
Broadly, the major controls on climate in the HKH 
region are latitude, altitude and position relative to the 
Asian monsoon airflow.8 The area shown in Figure 1 
extends from 9°N to 43°N and has the most extreme 
altitudinal change of anywhere in the world (sea level to 
8,848 metres at Mount Everest). Consequently, this huge 
area experiences every climate from tropical to extreme 
alpine. Such is the topography of the Himalaya that the 
tropical climate zone penetrates farther north in South 
Asia than anywhere else in the world. This phenomenon 
is most pronounced in the eastern Himalaya, where the 
valley of the Yarlung Tsangpo Brahmaputra channels 
warm air from the Bay of Bengal into the mountains and 
northward into Tibet.
Of all the factors affecting regional climate in the HKH 
region, the Asian monsoon is certainly one of the most 
important.9 The monsoon is a wind that transports vast 
amounts of moisture and energy from the Indian Ocean 
in the summer months, and arises from the considerable 
differences in air pressure between southern and central 
Asia, which in turn is a consequence of temperature 
variations between the inner parts of the continent and 
the surrounding oceans. The summer monsoon arises 
when high pressure develops over the Indian Ocean, 
warm water evaporates and the resulting humid air 
flows northwards. Upon reaching the Himalaya, the 
air rises and cools, the moisture condenses and heavy 
precipitation ensues. The summer monsoon begins in 
the southeast of the Himalaya at around the end of May 
and slowly migrates westward to reach Kashmir by early 
July, but it also penetrates into southeast Tibet by moving 
northwards along the Yarlung Tsangpo–Brahmaputra 
valley. 
The monsoon becomes drier as it moves westward, and 
winds reaching the Tibetan plateau are dry, which is why 
this region lies in a rain shadow and is very arid. Thus, 
during the winter monsoon, with high pressure over 
central Asia, it is dry air that flows southwards. However, 
the western Himalaya and adjoining Karakoram range 
do receive significant precipitation from storms tracking 
west during the winter. The resultant snow accumulation, 
coupled with the decline in summer temperature and 
runoff in this region since 1961, explains why glaciers 
in the Karakoram are thickening and expanding.10 The 
Indian monsoon exhibits decadal variation, but on 
average it accounts for about 70% of the annual rainfall 
for the region, which falls between June and September.
Glaciers	and	meltwater
The Himalayan region alone has the largest 
concentration of glaciers outside the polar ice caps. The 
Himalayan glaciers act as the source of many of Asia’s 
great rivers which supply water to about one third of 
the world’s population, according to some estimates.11 
While this represents the number of people living in 
river basins with tributaries coming from glacierised 
mountains, this is a misleading generalisation.12 The 
greatest vulnerability of large numbers of people to 
glacier state and dynamics occurs along the Indus and 
Tarim, where melt waters from glaciers comprise around 
40% of average river flow. However, in most cases glacier 
melt represents a fairly small component of the total 
river flow (see Table 1). 
The effects of global warming are already evident in 
the Himalayas where some two-thirds of glaciers are 
retreating fast (Figure 5).13 Overall, the Himalayan 
glaciers are retreating faster than many others around 
the world (see Figure 6); they are thinning by up to one 
metre per year and retreating at rates ranging from 10 
to 60 metres per year, and many small glaciers (less than 
0.2 square kilometres) have already disappeared.14 It is 
apparent that the rate of glacier retreat has accelerated in 
recent times in comparison to the 1970s.15 During the 
last 30 years there has been a shrinkage of 5.5% in the 
volume of glaciers in China, and similar rates are found 
in Nepal, India and Bhutan.16 During a glacier retreat, 
Figure	5:		The	Gangotri	glacier	in	the	Indian	
Himalaya,	showing	ice	retreat,	1780–2001	
Note: Image courtesy of NASA Earth Observatory.
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the formation of new lakes is likely, as is merging and 
expansion of existing lakes, at the toe of a valley glacier. 
This may increase the risks of flooding (as discussed in 
Section 3 below) and changes in stream flow may have 
significant effects on ecosystems and water users.
It is increasingly recognised that glacial conditions in 
the region are very diverse, and so are their responses 
to climate change. If the main trend in most of High 
Asia does seem to be glacier retreat, various lines of 
evidence show that it is occurring at very different 
rates in different mountains, even within the same 
mountain range.17A 2006 survey of 5,020 glaciers in 
the mountains of western China and the Tibetan Plateau 
found widely differing rates of reduction. It also found 
that 894 glaciers, about 18%, have advanced in recent 
decades.18 Variables, such as elevation, snowfall and 
the nourishment of these glaciers, alter glacier mass 
and behaviour. Given the inadequacies of available 
information and monitoring and the total absence of 
glacier monitoring, at elevations where the most critical 
ice and climate changes occur, predictions of glacier melt 
must be approached with caution. Recent evidence of 
glacier advances in the Karakoram Himalaya, illustrate 
many of these complexities.19 
Ecosystem	degradation
In the HKH region, most of the land area consists of 
wetlands or rangelands (see Table 1), vital in the region’s 
water cycle. Acting as a buffer for glacial meltwater and 
runoff from precipitation, these ecosystems help to 
ensure that year-round stream flow remains relatively 
stable, as well as acting as valuable resources for local 
people. Although systematic data are still lacking, current 
observations indicate a general trend of degradation in 
Himalayan ecosystems, caused by human and climatic 
forces reducing their capacity to store and release water. 
If current trends continue, there may be an overall 
increase in seasonal stream-flow variations, combined 
with more major droughts and floods.20 In addition 
to seriously affecting local livelihoods, degradation 
of high-altitude ecosystems is likely to have serious 
implications for the safety, food security and water 
security of downstream populations, many of whom are 
ill-equipped to mitigate or adapt to the shocks that such 
changes will bring.
High-altitude rangeland covers approximately 2.1 
million square kilometres, or 60% of total land area 
in the HKH region. Around half of this land type is 
currently suffering from varying degrees of degradation. 
In addition to supporting biodiversity and livelihoods, 
rangeland plays an important role in regional 
hydrology.21 Current patterns of soil erosion and loss of 
foliage cover are likely to lead to lower levels of water 
retention coupled with increased runoff. Higher rates of 
water loss through evaporation from bare, sandy soil may 
also decrease the overall transfer of water from wetlands 
to downstream areas.22 The factors involved in the 
degradation process are complex but it is increasingly 
accepted that warmer and drier climatic trends in the 
region are likely to be behind much of the current 
damage to grassland vegetation.23 Rising temperatures 
are also causing the shrinking of rangeland permafrost 
layers in higher areas, with observed consequences of 
increased soil instability and erosion.24 
Wetlands, as defined by the Ramsar convention, include 
all areas of marsh, fen and peatland, together with 
associated lakes.25 Currently, they cover around 17% of 
the land in the HKH region. Wetlands at the headwaters 
of the region’s rivers act like a sponge, absorbing 
fluctuating amounts of incoming water from glaciers 
and precipitation before releasing it downstream. This 
is particularly important in winter, when the release of 
water accumulated earlier in the year offsets reductions 
in meltwater flow.26 
Although wetlands in the HKH region are relatively 
under-researched, there are indications of a general trend 
of retreat. A recent satellite survey of the Qinghai-Tibetan 
plateau has shown a 10% reduction in wetland areas 
since the late 1970s.27 More locally focused studies have 
also reported substantial losses, with one protected area 
in Kashmir shrinking by as much as 28%.28 Increased 
air and surface temperatures and drops in precipitation 
brought on by current climate trends have all been 
highlighted as having negative effects on wetland areas.29 
Although increases in meltwater flows as a result of 
glacial retreat may actually increase wetland coverage 
in the short term, this trend is likely to reverse once 
volumes peak. This is likely to be more acute in rain-
shadow areas, where wetlands are fed almost exclusively 
by glacial streams. In addition, wetlands are particularly 
vulnerable to the scouring effect of glacial-lake outburst 
Figure	6:	Changes	in	masses	of	Himalaya	and	
other	glaciers	
Source: Dyurgerov and Meier (2005), cited in ICIMOD (2007), page 5.
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floods (GLOFs), as discussed further in Section 3 
below.30 
Rapid silting will also affect the water-storage capacity of 
wetlands. Soil eroded from deforested areas has already 
had a serious impact on Kashmiri wetlands,31 with 
similar effects likely in cases of degraded rangeland on 
the Tibetan plateau. Pollution, agricultural reclamation, 
overgrazing, and submersion by reservoir lakes are all 
leading to an overall reduction in the extent and quality 
of wetland areas.32 
The	effects	of	climate	change
Because of the great range of climate variability in 
the HKH region, it is possible here to make only very 
general comments about past, present and future climate 
trends and variability. Some key facts are presented in 
Table 2. The region overall has shown consistent trends 
in warming during the past 100 years with some areas 
exhibiting greater warming than the global average 
of 0.74°C over this period.33 The degree of warming 
appears to increase with elevation, as observed in Tibet 
and Nepal, and warming is more pronounced in winter 
than in summer.34 In fact, in some mountains, such 
as the Karakoram and Hindu Kush and the Hengduan 
in southwest China, summer temperatures exhibit 
consistent decline.35 
Climate change has a direct effect on the hydrological 
cycle. Perhaps nowhere else on Earth will this be more 
significant than in the HKH region, with huge volumes 
of water moving from mountains to sea. Changes in 
precipitation have been observed throughout the region, 
but these are highly variable (see Table 2). Decreasing 
trends in annual mean rainfall have been observed in the 
arid plains of Pakistan and northeast India and the total 
number of rainy days and annual amount of precipitation 
has decreased.36 However, the frequency of occurrence 
of intense rainfall events has increased in many parts of 
Asia, in particular during summer monsoons, with the 
possibility of these causing more mass movements and 
more severe flooding.37 
Table	2:	Key	observed	trends	in	temperature	and	rainfall	in	the	HKH	region	
Country/region Change	in	temperature,	heatwaves Change	in	precipitation,	intense	rains	and	floods
Tibetan Plateau 0.16°C per decade increase in annual temperatures; 
0.32°C per decade increase in annual winter 
temperatures
Precipitation generally increasing in northeast region
China Warming during the last 50 years, which is more 
pronounced in winter than in summer, and the rate 
of increase is more pronounced in minimum than 
in maximum temperatures. Increase in frequency of 
short duration heatwaves in recent decade; increasing 
warmer days and nights in recent decades
Annual rainfall has declined in past decade in north 
and northeast China, but has increased in western 
China, the Yangtze River and along the southeast 
coast. Increasing frequency of extreme rains in 
western and southern parts, including Yangtze River, 
and decrease in northern regions; more frequent 
floods along the Yangtze River (in past decade) and in 
northeast China (since 1990); more intense summer 
rains in east China; seven-fold increase in flood 
frequency since the 1950s
India 0.68°C increase per century; increasing trends 
in annual mean temperature; warming more 
pronounced during post-monsoon and winter. 
Frequency of hot days and multiple-day heatwaves 
has increased in past century
Increase in extreme rains in northwest during 
summer monsoon in recent decades; lower number 
of rainy days along east coast. Serious and recurrent 
floods in Bangladesh, Nepal and northeast India 
during 2002, 2003 and 2004; record 944mm in 
Mumbai in July 2005; floods in Surat, Barmer and 
Srinagar during 2006 summer monsoon
Nepal 0.09°C per year change in Himalayas and 0.04°C in 
Terai region, more in winter
No distinct long-term trends in precipitation records 
for 1948–1994. Serious and recurrent floods in 
Bangladesh, Nepal and northeast India during 2002, 
2003 and 2004
Pakistan 0.6–1.0°C rise in mean temperature in coastal areas 
since early 1900s
10–15% decrease in coastal belt and hyper-arid plains; 
increase in summer and winter precipitation over the 
last 40 years in northern Pakistan
Bangladesh An increasing trend of about 1°C in May and 0.5°C in 
November during the period 1985–1998
Decadal rain anomalies above long-term averages 
since 1960s. Serious and recurrent floods in 
Bangladesh, Nepal and northeast India during 2002, 
2003 and 2004
Source: Information taken from Cruz et al. (2007).
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Figures 7 and 8 give an idea of the regional temperature 
and precipitation changes that may occur within the next 
century. 
Warming is likely to be well above the global mean in 
central Asia, the Tibetan Plateau and northern Asia, and 
above the global mean in eastern and South Asia.
Winter precipitation is very likely to increase in northern 
Asia and the Tibetan Plateau, and likely to increase in 
eastern Asia and the southern parts of South-East Asia.
Precipitation in summer is likely to increase in Northern, 
East and South Asia and most of Southeast Asia, but is 
likely to decrease in Central Asia.There is very likely to 
be an increase in the frequency of intense precipitation 
events in parts of South Asia and in East Asia.
Extreme rainfall and winds associated with tropical 
cyclones are likely to increase in East, Southeast and 
South Asia.38 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the projected 
changes in climate and associated processes in and 
around the HKH region up to 2100, it is probably safe 
to say that many of the changes already observed, such 
as those in Table 2 for example, will continue. Thus, 
regional warming is likely to continue and many, but not 
all, glaciers are likely to continue receding, especially at 
lower elevations. Precipitation, including extreme rainfall 
events, is likely to increase throughout much of the 
area, which will probably lead to more frequent and/
or more intense flooding during the summer monsoon. 
The apparent increasing variability in the summer 
monsoon rains, coupled with the unsustainable use of 
water resources, will increase the probability of more 
severe drought during dry seasons. An understanding 
of the hydrologic system in the HKH region and the 
river basins stemming from it is essential to underpin 
appropriate water management strategies from now on. 
This will require extensive transboundary cooperation, 
which in itself presents a huge challenge. 
Figure	7:	Projected	changes	in	surface	air	
temperature	for	the	Tibetan	Plateau	and	South	
Asia,	2010–2099	
Note:  The changes are relative to the baseline period, 1961–1990 for the Tibetan 
Plateau (75–100ºE, 30–50ºN) and South Asia (65–100ºE, 5–30°N). Data from 
Cruz et al. (2007), Table 10.5. Data for SRES scenario A1 (highest future emission 
scenario) and B1 (lowest future emission scenario), with the global averages marked 
by black boxes for comparison. DJF – December, January, February; MAM – March, 
April, May; JJA – June, July, August; SON – September, October, November.
Figure	8:	Projected	changes	in	precipitation	for	
the	Tibetan	Plateau	and	South	Asia,	2010–2099
Note:  The changes are relative to the baseline period, 1961–1990 for the Tibetan 
Plateau (75–100ºE, 30–50ºN) and South Asia (65–100ºE, 5–30°N). Data from 
Cruz et al. (2007). Data for SRES scenario A1 (highest future emission scenario) and 
B1 (lowest future emission scenario). DJF – December, January, February; MAM – 
March, April, May; JJA – June, July, August; SON – September, October, November.
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Alongside natural causes, new and continuing human 
activities have become ‘primary drivers’ of pressures on 
water resources.39 Often, water scarcity is a function 
of poor governance, rather than a lack of resources. 
Population growth, more water-intensive agriculture, 
economic development and the collective pursuit 
of higher living standards are disrupting the natural 
balance of water systems and putting water resources 
under increasing stress. The result is aggressive over-
exploitation and massive environmental degradation.
Growing	urban	populations	
Population growth is already putting massive pressure 
on regional water resources, affecting water in terms of 
demand, water-use patterns and management practices. 
Despite varying regional trends, the overall situation 
in the HKH region is one of rapid population growth, 
migration and urbanisation. These represent some of the 
greatest pressures on water through increased demand 
and pollution. Some 60% of the world’s population lives 
in Asia and it is estimated that there will be another 1.5 
billion people in Asia by 2050.40 
Asia has been experiencing increasingly rapid 
urbanisation since the 1970s. Approximately one third 
of Asia’s inhabitants now live in urban areas, compared 
with one in ten in the previous generation (see Table 
3). It is estimated that one out of every two Asians will 
live in cities before 2025.41 Increased urbanisation 
boosts water demand through higher incomes, which 
in turn precipitates shifts in diets, such as increased 
consumption of more water-intensive foods such 
as meat, fruit and dairy products. In China, meat 
consumption has doubled over the past 20 years and is 
expected to double again by 2030. 
While the rapid growth of cities has brought enormous 
economic benefits to most Asian cities, raising living 
standards and reducing poverty, these have come at 
considerable social and environmental costs. Many 
people who leave rural areas move into one of the 
Asian mega-cities (metropolitan areas with at least 
10 million inhabitants), such as Shanghai, Dhaka 
and Mumbai, many of which are coastal. However, 
urban infrastructures are ill prepared to cope with this 
increased mass movement of people. No city highlights 
these vulnerabilities better than Dhaka in Bangladesh, 
which is projected to expand from 13 million to 22 
million people by 2025 (see Table 4). The city has the 
highest population density in the world, but this is 200 
times greater in its slums – astounding considering this 
area is covered by single-storey houses. Some 60% of 
households have no sewerage, and 90% of inhabitants 
2 The people of the HKH region 
Table	3:	Urban	population	in	selected	Asian	countries,	1950,	2000	and	2030
1950 2000 2030
Country Urban 
population 
(million)
Urban 
population 
(percentage 
of total)
Percentage 
growth  
(1950-2000)
Urban 
population 
(million)
Urban 
population 
(percentage 
of total)
Percentage 
growth 
(2000-2030)
Urban 
population 
(million)
Urban 
population 
(percentage of 
total)
China 69.53 12.5 556 456.34 35.8 94 883.42 59.5
India 61.70 17.3 352 279.05 27.7 107 575.68 40.9
Pakistan 6.95 17.5 573 46.76 33.1 185 133.23 48.9
Bangladesh 1.78 4.2 1837 34.354 25 187 98.55 44.3
Vietnam 3.19 11.6 472 18.19 24.1 150 45.49 41.3
Nepal 1.94 2.3 41 2.73 11.8 299 10.90 26.1
Bhutan 0.02 2.1 650 0.15 7.1 507 0.76 17.9
Source: United Nations (2002).
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share a room with more than three people. In many 
regions, the rate of slum formation is nearly the same 
as overall urban growth.42 Continued urbanisation will 
further strain the sustainability of cities unless there are 
major improvements in governance and management 
and massive investment in infrastructure.43 The growth 
of these cities is very likely to result in more people 
inhabiting low-lying coastal areas vulnerable to predicted 
rises in sea level.
While inhabitants of the mega-cities are expected 
to represent 7.5% of the global population by 2015 
(compared to 3.7% in 2010),44 they nevertheless do 
and will continue to consume the lion’s share of natural 
resources. However, although the mega-cities justly 
receive a great deal of attention, the majority of the 
urban population lives in smaller cities (under 500,000 
people) or in semi-urban areas. The distinction between 
rural and urban areas is becoming highly blurred in 
many regions, as people in rural areas diversify into non-
agricultural activities without substantial movements into 
urban areas, or people migrate to settle on the periphery 
of cities.45 This phenomenon is widespread throughout 
South and East Asia and is putting even greater stresses 
on water and other natural resources, because such areas 
lack the formal management systems to allocate and use 
water resources safely and efficiently. As communities 
become more geographically spread out and less 
dependent on local resources, there is subsequently less 
incentive to contribute to the management of common 
resources such as water.46 This massive, unprecedented 
population movement, especially to urban fringes, will 
present new types of water- and wastewater-related 
challenges for all HKH region countries.47 
Environmental	migration	and	
displacement
People have always used migration as a livelihood 
adaptation strategy in the Himalayan region, moving in 
search of work, resources or better security. Migration 
presents challenges for rural communities, but also offers 
many potential benefits for strengthening livelihoods, 
poverty alleviation and natural resources management. 
The benefits generated by financial remittances are 
huge, representing a major source of income in most 
HKH region countries, including remittances from 
urban to rural areas, between countries within the 
region and from outside the region. In Nepal, almost 
half of households in mountainous regions received 
remittances totalling 35% of their income.48 However, 
the numbers of people moving have risen rapidly 
during the last decades and, with its growing scale and 
complexity, migration is emerging as a major issue in 
the HKH region. Some 30 million (15%) of the world’s 
total migrants now come from the Himalayan region, 
with flows doubling since 2002.49 In the next decade, 
should river flows reduce significantly, migration out of 
irrigated areas could be massive.50 
Studies by the European Commission have shown that 
‘environmental change affects human mobility most 
directly through livelihoods, which are dependent 
on ecosystem services such as agriculture, herding 
and fishing’.51 The majority of people living in the 
Himalayan region rely directly on ecosystem services for 
their existence. Moreover, almost 70% of people in the 
mountain areas live in poverty, with limited resources 
and livelihood options. In the future, increasingly 
unreliable water supplies and environmental changes are 
likely to impact upon livelihoods, which in turn could 
force people to migrate. 
In China ‘environmental migration’ is used to describe 
planned ‘re-location of people from ecologically fragile 
regions or those with an important ecological role 
to other areas, with the aim of achieving regulated 
economic and social development of population, 
resources and the environment’.52 However, at regional 
level, only Chongqing municipality currently keeps 
records of its annual numbers of environmental 
migrants,53 and there are few reliable estimates of the 
broader numbers of ‘environmentally displaced’ people. 
A tentative general estimate for the total number of 
people displaced to date in China as a whole has been 
Table	4:	Projected	growth	of	the	Asian	mega-city	to	2025	
City
Population	2007	
(million)
World	size	
ranking
Population	2025	
(million)
World	size
	ranking
Mumbai 18.98 5 26.39 2
Delhi 15.92 6 22.50 3
Shanghai 14.99 7 19.41 9
Dhaka 13.49 10 22.02 4
Karachi 12.13 12 19.10 10
Beijing 11.11 16 14.55 15
Source: UN-HABITAT, 2008.
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set at 30 million, although there is little firm empirical 
evidence to support such claims.57 
Displacement caused by large infrastructure projects, 
especially dam construction, has become common in 
China – as in other countries within the region – in 
response to the escalating demand for electricity and 
water associated with rapid urbanisation. In the Three 
Gorges Dam Project, more than 1.4 million people were 
moved.58 People displaced in these projects are normally 
poor and powerless and do not participate in any way 
in decision-making concerning the projects. Their 
resettlement conditions are very often unsatisfactory. In 
many cases there are likely to also be further, unintended 
environmental consequences of such projects forcing 
more environmental migration.59 
Case	study	1:	Seasonal	migration	for	survival	in	the	Ganges	Delta
Temporary displacement and seasonal migration for survival have already become commonplace in 
Bangladesh. Densely populated Bangladesh is situated in a low-lying river delta, exposed to cyclones, 
storm surges and potential sea-level rise. Moreover, over half the population still relies on subsistence 
crop agriculture, and over 23% live on less than US$1/day. Consequently, it is believed that more 
environmental migrants will come from Bangladesh than from any other country. By 2100 more than 
25% of the country may be inundated, permanently displacing 15 million people. 
Flooding currently displaces about 500,000 people every year. In 1998 flooding submerged 68% of the 
country and temporarily displaced 30 million people. The massive flooding in 2007 affected 10 million 
people and reduced crop yields by 13%. This was followed by Cyclone Sidr only months later, which 
further devastated the country. Millions more people were exposed to food insecurity requiring 
evacuation, shelter and relief assistance. 
The increased intensity of floods has exacerbated land erosion along riverbanks – the main direct 
cause of landlessness.54 At the same time, returns from crop production are also declining. With 
widespread failure of rural livelihoods, struggling farmers have been migrating to urban areas. Although 
people are desperately trying to find alternative ways to adapt, mainly by leaving agriculture for other 
livelihoods such as shrimp farming, the worsening environmental situation could render migration 
the most realistic available option for many Bangladeshis. There is a noticeable lack of investment in 
finding viable alternative livelihoods for those vulnerable to climate change.55
Case	study	2:	Response	to	reduced	water	supply	in	Minqin	County,	China
In Minqin County, Gansu, problems of water supply have been increasing over the past two decades. 
The oasis there is fed by the Shiyang River, with headwaters located in the Qilian range. Snowfall on 
the mountains has been steadily decreasing, with snowlines retreating at an average rate of around 
2 metres per year. The amount of water flowing annually into the oasis via the Shiyang has fallen 
from an average of 400–600 million cubic metres in the 1960s to just 85 million in 2002. If current 
trends continue, the river is expected to be virtually dry by the end of 2010. To date, the county’s 
people have resorted to ever-increasing levels of groundwater extraction. A recent report estimates 
that non-sustainable groundwater extraction in Minqin County is currently 428 million cubic metres 
per year, causing groundwater levels to fall by an annual average of 0.4–1.0 metres.56 Consequently, 
authorities have developed a strategy to reduce local population in line with falling water availability, 
thus attempting to use environmental migration to mitigate environmental problems, and attracting 
widespread criticism within China and abroad.
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To date, the majority of China’s ‘environmental 
migration’ projects have involved the relocation of 
nomadic communities away from fragile grassland 
areas. Resettlement programmes for Tibetan nomads 
were introduced in the 1960s, and have since expanded. 
Some 60,000 people were displaced from the Three 
Rivers Source area, Qinghai province, between 2003 
and 2008,60 and the current goal of the provincial 
government is to settle all nomadic herders by 2011.61 
Recent studies have shown that the resettlement scheme 
is creating new social problems and the environmental 
benefits are uncertain. It seems that this kind of project 
may be as much about the urbanisation of nomadic 
peoples (largely ethnic Tibetans and Mongolians) as it is 
concerned with protecting the environment.
Agricultural	productivity	and	water	use
The agricultural productivity of many parts of the 
HKH region and the adjacent plains areas are heavily 
dependent on the availability of dry-season water 
from the Himalayan glaciers. The shrinking of the 
glaciers therefore could seriously threaten the long-
term sustainability of food production in the region. 
Agriculture is by far the main consumer of water (see 
Table 5), accounting for 95% of total water use, against 
an average global agricultural use of 70%. In most 
countries in the region, agriculture continues to be the 
most important sector of the economy in terms of its 
contribution to GDP, food security62 and employment. 
Projected water allocations suggest that by 2030, 
agriculture will continue to be the primary user of 
fresh water, even as domestic and industrial demands, 
including for energy production, increase sharply.
Economic development, especially in China and India, 
is increasing demand for more varied, water-intensive 
diets, including meat and dairy products. Wheat and 
feed grains have increasingly emerged as particularly 
important cereal crops in a region traditionally 
dominated by rice consumption. Between 1967 and 
1997, meat consumption more than tripled, and demand 
for dairy products more than doubled. Consumption 
of high-value crops such as fruit, sugar and edible oils 
also increased substantially.63 Overall, demand for food 
and animal feed is expected to double in the next 50 
years.64 At the same time agriculture is facing increased 
competition for water supplies from industrial and 
domestic usage.
Irrigation has been vital to food security and improving 
rural welfare in the HKH region, especially during 
the Green Revolution. From 1970 to 1995, the area 
under irrigation in Asia more than doubled (see Figure 
9), making this the world’s most intensively irrigated 
continent.65 China and India are now the biggest 
grain producers in the world, together producing half 
the world’s wheat and rice. However, irrigation, and 
accompanying technological innovations in fertiliser 
and insecticides have been both capital-and water- 
intensive. While this expanding water use was the key 
factor for tripling the world’s grain harvest between 
1950 and 2000, the consequence is that Asia has been 
accumulating a water deficit in some regions. Over 
time, the efficiency levels of state irrigation schemes 
have dropped, and individual farmers have turned 
increasingly to using diesel and electric pumps to obtain 
groundwater. Privately pumped groundwater now 
represents the bulk of irrigation water in some countries 
in the region. (This is discussed further below under 
‘Extraction and loss of groundwater’.)
Grain production has actually stagnated in the HKH 
region since the1990s due to high production costs 
and low returns because of the artificially low price 
of grains.66 As a result, many farmers in the region 
have been substituting grain for other crops or even 
abandoned land. In Nepal, as much as 30% of cultivated 
land has been abandoned.67 Between 1979 and 1995, 
China lost more than 14.5 million hectares of arable 
land due to increasing urbanisation, industrialisation 
and population growth. Farmers are substituting food 
Figure	9:	Irrigated	areas	of	Asia,	1961	and	2003
Source: IWMI-FAO, 2009.
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Table	5:		Withdrawal	of	fresh	water	by	sector	in	
selected	countries,	2000	
Country
Percentage	of	national	water	use
Agriculture Domestic Industrial
Afghanistan 98.19 1.81 0.00
Bangladesh 96.17 3.19 0.65
Bhutan 95.24 4.76 1.19
India 86.46 8.09 5.45
Nepal 96.46 2.95 0.59
Pakistan 96.03 1.93 2.05
China 67 6 25
Source: FAO, AQUASTAT database.
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crops for other products and the resulting sharp increase 
in food-crop prices is further weakening overall food 
security in the Himalayan region.68 Pakistan is losing 
cropland in other ways, notably as Middle Eastern 
investors are making large purchases of farmland. 
It is rumoured that these land deals are aimed at 
monopolising local water rights, and the Economist has 
reported a reference to them as ‘the great water grab’.69 
Water	shortages	and	food	security	
There is increasing concern that water scarcity and 
pollution could create dangerous shortfalls in agricultural 
production in some areas of the HKH region, particularly 
in the Punjab region of India, which produces 
the country’s largest agricultural surpluses, and in 
neighbouring Pakistan.70 Existing signs of growing water 
scarcity include declining water tables in North India, 
Pakistan, and North China, and drier rivers, such as the 
Yellow River in China, no longer discharging to the sea for 
extended periods of time. Climatic change may aggravate 
water shortages in these areas. Although some estimates on 
China’s agricultural production are cautiously optimistic, 
a recent report released by the International Water 
Management Institute (IWMI) and the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) warns that water scarcity 
will cause widespread food shortages in Asia in the near 
future, unless water efficiency is improved.71 Another UN 
report, “The Environmental Food Crisis”, warned that the 
melting glaciers and snow could jeopardize world food 
security and drive prices to unprecedented levels.72 While 
food demand is rising rapidly, the option of expanding 
irrigated land area in Asia to feed a growing population is 
becoming increasingly problematic due to both water and 
land constraints. In South Asia, for example, 94% of the 
land suitable for farming is already in production.73 
To meet expected cereal demand by 2050 (see Table 6), 
IWMI’s projections show that, with present trends of 
yield growth, irrigated farmland would have to increase 
by 30% in South Asia and by 47% in East Asia. Without 
water-productivity gains, South Asia would need 57% 
more water for irrigated agriculture and East Asia 70% 
more. Given the existing scarcity of land and water, such 
a scenario is highly untenable unless action is taken now.
While some official data from both India and China 
present an optimistic picture of future food security, the 
international consensus predicts a major slow-down in 
agricultural growth.74 The Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
estimates that crop yields could decrease by up to 30% 
in Central and South Asia by the mid-21st century due to 
water stress. In its long-term scenario, the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) envisions that by 
2020 cereal production in China and India will fall by 
15%, resulting in a shift from near food sufficiency in 
cereals to huge imports. In Bangladesh wheat production 
is expected to fall by 32%, and rice production by 8%. 
In Pakistan, it is estimated that by 2025, there will be a 
shortfall of 28 million tonnes in the production of all 
major food grains and crops due to water shortages.75 
Recent scenarios presented in the IWMI-FAO report76 
however do not incorporate climate change, which is 
likely to make rainfall more erratic and increase the strain 
on already overstretched irrigation systems. In 2009, the 
Indian monsoon was late and weak, following the lowest 
June rainfall in 80 years. Areas around the Yellow River 
in China suffered severe droughts in 2008, and lower 
precipitation is affected by El Niño. As a result, even the 
IWMI-FAO reports pessimistic assumptions may prove 
overly optimistic. However, as the report highlights, 
there are multiple opportunities available to improve the 
efficiency of irrigation and water-use which are urgently 
needed. More investment in innovative water-saving 
technologies and alternative options such as rain-fed 
farming could boost production to adequate levels. 
Extraction	and	loss	of	groundwater
Countries have been pursuing unsustainable policies 
of aggressive groundwater use. In some of Asia’s key 
agricultural areas, including the Punjab in India and the 
North China plain, pumping underground aquifers is 
causing water tables to fall by 2–3 metres per year.77 The 
motivation to rely more upon groundwater has been 
fuelled by populist policies that provide heavy subsidies. 
Accordingly, farmers often pump more groundwater 
than is needed for optimising crop production, and 
there is no regulatory framework to control groundwater 
extraction. If the present rate of extraction is maintained, 
it is estimated that the aquifers below the north China 
plain will become completely dry in 30–40 years.78 
In India, where nationally groundwater provides 45-
50% of irrigation needs and 50-80% of domestic water 
usage,79 groundwater depletion is a serious concern. 
Table	6:	Demand	for	food	in	South	and	East	Asia,	
2000	and	2050
South	Asia East	Asia
Crop 2000 2050 Change (%) 2000 2050 Change (%)
Wheat 96 205 114 121 193 60
Maize 17 32 88 184 341 85
Rice 113 202 79 219 287 31
Total 
cereals* 
249 471 89 529 935 77
Meat 8 32 300 75 190 153
Milk 114 382 235 19 60 216
* Includes food and feed; production figures in millions of tonnes.  
  Source: de Fraiture et al. 2007
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Suicides of farmers who cannot get enough water to 
continue planting have become common in recent 
years,85 including instances of protest by mass suicide.86 
Water	wastage
Water resources are under stress not only because of 
over-extraction of groundwater, but also because of 
inefficiency. Of all sectors, agriculture has the lowest 
water efficiency and the lowest output per unit of 
water.87 In China, according to one estimate, a cubic 
metre of water sent from the countryside to Tianjin 
yields 60 times as much income in the urban area as it 
does in the countryside.88 Thus, in economic, though 
not necessarily in social terms, any significant reductions 
in water usage would probably have to come from 
rural areas. Artificially low water prices have resulted in 
endemic water wastage across the agricultural sector. 
More commercial pricing of water would provide 
incentives to increase efficiency, but any significant rise 
in water prices would drive millions of marginal farmers 
over the edge and accelerate the rapid rush to the cities. 
More expensive water would almost certainly mean 
decreased agricultural output and increased demand for 
imported food. Consequently water saving in agriculture, 
though vital, is likely to come slowly and painfully.89 
Inappropriate water management has contributed to 
environmental and supply problems, including water-
quality reduction, water-logging and salinisation. State 
policies continue to lead farmers in some water-scarce 
areas of Pakistan and India to opt for water-intensive 
crops such as rice and sugarcane. One recent example is 
the Water Transfer Project in China, designed to transfer 
Case	study	3:	Groundwater	levels	in	the	GBM	delta
Shallow groundwater levels in the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GMB) delta vary with the wet and 
dry seasons in this region of West Bengal and Bangladesh. It has generally been assumed that shallow 
aquifers throughout Bangladesh are annually recharged every monsoon, but a recent study80 has 
found that this may not be the case and that shallow groundwater storage is decreasing. Some of the 
decrease is associated with the city of Dhaka, but most of the decline is associated with groundwater 
abstraction for irrigation for rice production, which has more than doubled in recent decades. In the 
Dhaka district, groundwater abstraction is increasing rapidly, largely associated with industrial and 
domestic usage.
Recent data published from the NASA Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) 
for northern and North-Western India, eastern Pakistan and parts of Bangladesh confirm that 
groundwater is being used at a highly unsustainable rate, particularly for crop irrigation. Between 
2002 and 2008 rainfall was close to the long-term climatic mean and other terrestrial water-storage 
components (snow, glaciers, surface water, soil moisture and biomass) did not contribute significantly 
to the observed decline in total water levels. Therefore, the major contributor by far to groundwater 
depletion was human activity and not natural decline or variability in precipitation and other sources 
of water.81
Further, in estuarine and southern coastal regions in Bangladesh, groundwater levels have been rising 
over the past two decades, corresponding with rising sea level in this area.82 The abstraction of 
groundwater and rise in sea level both cause the freshwater–seawater interface in shallow aquifers to 
rise and seawater to penetrate inland, perhaps as far as 100km in some parts of the GBM delta.83 Salt-
water intrusion in the coastal zone threatens the world’s largest mangrove forest in the Sundarbans,84 
where fresh ground and surface waters are essential for maintaining a salinity level that allows 
mangroves to exist. 
The message is clear: if population continues to grow and water-intensive crops, such as rice, remain 
the staple food, the GBM delta and many other parts of Asia is likely to face a major growing water 
crisis. Shortages of potable water and reductions in agricultural output may result, potentially leading 
to extensive social, political and economic stress. Maize or sorghum could be a replacement for rice, 
but government policies and market demand would have to change to promote these less water-
intensive crops.
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massive volumes of water from the water-rich south 
to the water-poor north. However, some of this water 
is targeted for agricultural use to produce food for 
south China. In other words, this so-called solution has 
resulted in a ‘virtual water flow’ through food shipments 
from the north to the south, with increasingly apparent 
high economic and environmental costs.90 
Water	quality	and	pollution	
Water pollution is a growing concern in most Asian 
countries.91 Inadequate monitoring systems in many 
places result in a lack of information about pollution 
loads and water quality, and the often-serious impacts 
of polluting activities on human and ecosystem health 
remain unreported or under-reported. However, without 
substantial progress in regulation and enforcement, 
pollution is expected to increase as a result of economic 
development driven by urbanisation, industry and 
intensive agriculture.92 Section 3 of this report contains 
more information on groundwater contamination from 
saltwater intrusion and natural arsenic contamination.
At the domestic level, nearly all household water is 
eventually discharged as wastewater. Even in urban 
centres where wastewater is collected through sewer 
systems, this is often discharged to fresh-water, land or 
oceans after little or no treatment. This means that the 
problem of increasing contamination by wastewater 
is not being solved but simply transferred from one 
location to another. While attention focuses on the 
multiple challenges of mega-cities, smaller urban areas, 
with few financial and technical resources due to their 
lesser political influence, are set to continue current 
trends of poor wastewater management. Thus, water 
quality as well as water quantity is gravely threatened.
Industrial wastewater discharges mostly receive inadequate 
treatment in nearly all Asian countries. Land disposal of 
wastewater is also contaminating groundwater, which is 
often an important source of drinking supplies. Increasing 
use of agricultural chemicals is a further complication in 
the HKH region.93 In China, an estimated 70% of rivers 
are polluted, leaving 300 million people with limited 
access to clean water. In India the level of water pollution 
is unknown,94 but some 38 million people in India are 
affected by waterborne diseases due to contaminated 
drinking water, and an estimated 1.5 million children 
die of diarrhoeal disease each year.95 In southeast Asia 
in 2004,100 million people were estimated to be living 
without safe water and 185 million were without 
adequate sanitation.96
In a recent report the Asian Development Bank considers 
the scale of tackling pollution in Asia: ‘Considering the 
cost of construction and efficient operation of wastewater 
management systems, and the number of trained and 
experienced personnel needed to manage them – ranging 
from managers to plant operators and technicians, who 
are mostly not available at present – resolution of this 
problem in the foreseeable future will be a Herculean 
task’.97 The task is even greater given that we are dealing 
with transboundary water supplies, where water 
allocation needs to be negotiated with multiple countries, 
and that any waste-management systems need to be built 
to withstand floods, earthquakes and other disasters, such 
as the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. 
Hydropower	and	dam-building
Electricity generation across the HKH region is 
currently undergoing a period of rapid expansion, 
with almost all countries aiming at least to double their 
generating capacity within the next ten years. North 
of the Himalaya, China is currently balancing supply 
and demand, but plans to expand its capacity in line 
with continued high rates of GDP growth. By contrast, 
the electricity sector across much of South Asia is still 
struggling to keep pace with rapid economic growth.
With governments anxious to avoid energy supply 
becoming a constraint on growth, there are plans to 
install vast amounts of capacity very rapidly. India has 
stated that it will need to expand its generating potential 
more than five-fold by 2030 in order to sustain current 
levels of growth.98 Figure 10 shows some of the existing 
and planned infrastructure projects in the Himalayan 
region.
New hydropower projects are integral to the planned 
capacity development of all countries in the region, 
with the exception of Bangladesh, accounting for 
between 20% and 100% of all expansion. Given the 
urgency of these plans, the implications of this trend 
are serious. There is a real danger that questions about 
environmental and political impacts, and even the 
ultimate efficacy, of new dam projects will be overlooked 
as governments and suppliers struggle to meet ambitious 
targets. Smaller countries such as Bhutan and Laos are 
hoping to capitalise on their untapped hydroelectric 
resources, and to export electricity to energy-hungry 
neighbours. Problems such as severe seasonal stream-
flow variation in Vietnam have already highlighted 
how unreliable such projects can be.99 Should climate 
change or the obstruction of cross-border waterways 
substantially alter regional hydrology, this could have 
severe effects on many countries’ capacity to provide 
power to their citizens. 
The rivers that originate in the Himalaya provide 
sustenance and livelihood to hundreds of millions of 
people across South Asia, from the Indus Basin plains of 
Pakistan in the west to Bangladesh in the east. Massive 
plans are underway in Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bhutan 
to build several hundred dams in the region, with over 
150,000 Megawatts (MW) of new projects proposed 
over the next 20 years.100 If these plans are realised, the 
Himalayan region will have the highest concentration 
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of dams in the world, with far-reaching implications for 
the landscape, ecology and economy of the region. As 
forests, fields and settlements are submerged with the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, the 
wider impact of such mammoth development would be 
felt all the way down to the river deltas.
The changes in flow regime and sediment load imposed 
by new dams are likely to have substantial ramifications 
for agriculture and ecosystems downstream. Silt trapped 
in reservoir lakes not only has the potential to render 
dams inoperable, but also deprives farmland of valuable 
nutrients. The cumulative effect of several major dams 
in the upper reaches of a river on water provision 
downstream remains largely unknown, especially where 
the rivers cross national boundaries and while there is no 
effective means of jointly coordinating flow management. 
This is even more significant in the ambitious water-
transfer projects planned in India and China, which are set 
to involve the re-routing of enormous volumes of water 
between different river basins.
Because the Himalayan region is seismically active 
(see Section 1 above), there are inevitably dams at risk 
of failure during a major earthquake. In addition, the 
pressure of the water in lakes of several square kilometres 
locked behind a large dam may even contribute to an 
increase in the seismic activity beneath it, especially if the 
dam is built directly over a fault. As highlighted in the 
recent controversy over the Zipingpu dam’s contribution 
to the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, dams could end up 
becoming agents of their own demise. 
Climate change is also likely to have a significant effect on 
the safety, viability and overall impact of new dam projects. 
The effects of changing temperature and weather patterns 
are already being acutely felt in the Himalaya, resulting in 
an increase in extreme weather events, as well as a general 
trend of accelerating glacial melt. In light of plans for 
massive and widespread dam construction, the potential 
impact of such changes gives even more cause for concern. 
As glaciers melt, dams could be subjected to much higher 
stream flows, which could increase the possibility of 
major flooding as dams are forced to open their gates 
in order to release pressure. Also associated with glacial 
melt is the possibility of increased risk from glacial-lake 
outburst floods (as discussed in Section 3). The suddenness 
and intensity of these events raises questions about the 
increased risk of cascading dam failure downstream. High 
sediment loads in glacial meltwater could also clog up 
dam reservoirs, as could landslides from slopes destabilised 
by melting permafrost. Both would reduce energy-
generating capacity and, again, augment flood risk.
Longer-term, continued glacial retreat may eventually 
lead to a drop in river flows once meltwater volumes 
have peaked. This trend may be accompanied by 
more exaggerated peaks and troughs in seasonal flow 
variation.101 Both could directly affect the capacity of 
new dam projects to generate electricity. For countries 
Case	study	4:	China’s	dam-building	
China has built almost half of the world’s estimated 45,000 large dams and remains one of the 
most active dam-building countries in the world. As a result, China has also been responsible for 
correspondingly large amounts of human displacement and river alteration. A recent study by a 
research team under the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) found that 
more than 3,000 hydropower plants operating or planned along the Yangtze’s upper reaches and its 
tributaries suffer from weak management or supervision, and that several new dams on the Yellow 
River had cracked within three years of construction.
In recent years, China has shown an increasing interest in developing the hydroelectric potential 
of its transboundary watercourses. This could increase the potential for tension with neighbouring 
countries downstream worried about the security of their own water supplies. In addition to two 
existing dams, China is building at least eight more on the Mekong, while the future of several half-
built projects on the upper reaches of Myanmar’s Salween River is uncertain. The increasing number 
of dams built by Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia are also causing concern. Several Chinese projects in 
west-central Tibet also have a bearing on river-water flows into India. 
The South–North Water Transfer Project is particularly controversial. In addition to drawing water 
from tributaries of the Yangtze, China has also discussed the rerouting of water from the Brahmaputra 
northwards to the Yellow River. This proposal has been described by some Indian experts as a 
declaration of ‘water war’ on the lower-riparian states of India and Bangladesh. While China’s water 
resources minister described this ambitious project as not viable during a speech at Hong Kong 
University in 2006, the director of the Yellow River Water Conservancy Committee has stated 
publicly that the project has official sanction and could be underway before the end of 2010.102
23
like Laos and Bhutan, with development strategies 
depending on dam construction and historical river flow, 
the impact could be severe. In energy-starved Pakistan 
and India, rushed hydropower construction could 
likewise turn out to be a false saviour. 
Transboundary	water	management
In the Asian region, water resources are already over-
stretched by increasing demands from growing 
populations, rapid industrialisation and intensifying 
agriculture. At a national level, existing water-
management systems are ill prepared to surmount this 
impending water crisis, due to ineffectual regulatory 
mechanisms and fragmented institutions. India and 
China both face serious internal and cross-border 
pressures over water resources.103 At a regional level, 
institutional mechanisms for governing transboundary 
water resources remain limited. The Mekong River Basin 
Commission (MRC) has failed to live up to expectations 
largely due to China’s refusal to join and engage in 
binding dialogue on integrated watershed management. 
China’s dam-building projects (as discussed in Case 
Study 4 above) have taken precedence over ecological 
concerns.104 Intensive dam construction by Vietnam 
and Laos is already seriously affecting downstream 
populations, exacerbating regional tensions. The largest 
and most controversial of Laos’ 30 potential dams 
became fully operational in early 2010 despite violations 
of legal obligations to affected communities.105 
At the bilateral level, the Indus Waters Treaty negotiated 
between India and Pakistan in 1960 with the help of the 
World Bank is a rare example of a successful resolution 
of a major dispute over international waters.106 As a 
consequence of partition in 1947, the basin was divided 
between the two countries – headwaters in India and 
the lower basin in Pakistan – creating the potential for 
major conflict. Both sides accepted a proposal to divide 
the Indus waters equally between the two countries and 
at the same time enhance water.. The fact that the treaty 
has endured for four decades despite a nuclear stand-off 
between the two counties is testament to the high value 
attached to water resources for domestic agricultural 
production. However, in this case the agreement works 
on the basis of a separation of waters rather than a 
shared arrangement, and is not without tensions.
A bilateral agreement between India and Bangladesh also 
exists for sharing dry-season flow in the Ganges, but 
this has not proven to be very effective. At best, it has 
forced the two countries to establish a dialogue on flood 
management and hydropower generation. The Mahakali 
Treaty between India and Nepal has served a similar 
purpose by paving the way for the construction of the 
Pancheshwar multipurpose hydropower project. 
Critically, multilateral agreements that encourage water-
sharing on the basis of a common regional framework 
have yet to develop. While official recognition of the 
impending crisis now exists – in recent years governments 
have moved water issues higher on their national agendas 
– mutual distrust hinders effective action, and sovereignty 
concerns over-rule regional interests. Environmental 
cooperation generally lags far behind economic 
cooperation in the HKH region.107 Currently there is 
a general lack of policy direction and political will in 
tackling these issues because states continue to regard the 
management of water resources as a sovereign prerogative.
However, there is evidence that water issues have 
the potential to drive cooperation and facilitate 
conflict resolution. In 2002 China and India signed 
a memorandum of understanding that enables the 
sharing of hydrological data on the Brahmaputra.108 
Such information will be instrumental in instituting 
early warning systems and better flood management 
in the future. Annual Joint Expert Level meetings on 
Trans-Border Rivers have been held since 2008. India 
and China have also begun to discuss co-operation over 
monitoring the melting of glaciers in the Himalayas, a 
border region crucial to both countries’ water supplies 
and one over which they have gone to war.109 
Although uncertain information and knowledge about 
glacier melt processes have fuelled a wider debate about 
the nature of climate science, one positive outcome of the 
debate has been the immense awareness generated among 
politicians, the media, and the general public. In this 
context, the Indian government has taken a decision to 
establish a specialised glacier research centre.110 Similarly, 
the concept of the HKH region Environment initiated 
by the Chinese Academy of Sciences will have a positive 
impact on minimising the gaps in understanding.111 
Recent Indian and Chinese media reports have speculated 
that a formal agreement on bilateral cooperation in glacier 
research will be made in 2010.112 
In response to claims that its dam construction has been 
responsible for alarming declines in Mekong River flow, 
China has agreed to partial sharing of hydrological data 
with downstream countries.113 This is a positive step 
towards regional collaboration amid a water crisis, but 
a stronger data sharing arrangement is critical. China’s 
transparency and willingness to allay fears may motivate 
India to share Himalayan river data with Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Bangladesh. This would lead to better management 
of water resources in an integrated manner.114 
The International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development (ICIMOD) is playing a key role in 
facilitating increased cooperation in the HKH region. 
In December 2009 a project was launched to establish 
a regional flood information system in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna and Indus river basins. It is 
hoped that this will create a regional framework for 
information sharing and improve overall cooperation 
amongst participating countries in areas such as disaster 
preparedness.115 
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Overview
The hazard profile of the HKH region drainage basins 
generally varies with height. The mountainous upper 
reaches are more prone to earthquakes (eg. the Kashmir 
event in 2005), mass movements (eg. the giant failure 
of part of the west side of Nanga Parbat in 1841) and 
floods arising from the failure of natural dams and 
the boundaries of glacial lakes (eg. Dig Tsho in Nepal 
in 1985 and Lugge Tsho in Bhutan in 1994). Flatter 
downstream sections, deltas and coasts are more likely 
to experience floods (eg. the Bihar event in India in 
2008), droughts (eg. as in South-East Asia in 2005), 
windstorms and storm surges (eg. Cyclone Sidr in 
Bangladesh in 2007 and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 
2008), and groundwater contamination (eg. the ongoing 
arsenic problem in the Bengal basin). However, any of 
these events in one part of the region could also affect 
other parts of the region through, for example, loss of 
agricultural production and livelihoods, and migration 
and possible intra and inter-state conflict.
The HKH region offers an extraordinary panoply of 
future crisis drivers. The permutations of interlocking 
natural hazards and human interventions suggest crisis 
drivers unusual for both their complexity and their 
unpredictable dynamics. When these are placed in the 
context of a region of high population density and 
severe socio-economic pressures, the numbers of people 
affected by the impact of future crisis drivers could 
possibly overshadow some of the worst calamities that 
have befallen the continent of Africa in the previous two 
decades.
The analysis in this section focuses on the potential 
consequences of six types of natural phenomena: floods, 
earthquakes, mass movements, hazards in deltas and 
coastal zones, arsenic contamination, and fires and 
atmospheric brown clouds. When combined with the 
effects of human activities, these phenomena could 
plausibly lead to severe humanitarian crises in the HKH 
region over the next two decades. These six hazards, 
as discussed below, could trigger crises resulting from 
food insecurity, mass migration, destruction of human 
habitats and infrastructure, damage to industry and 
livelihoods, and exponential increases in disease and 
conflict. These crises are discussed in the second half of 
this section.
Environmental	hazards	and	their	
impacts
Floods and lake outbursts
The most severe and widespread flooding in the HKH 
region arises during the summer monsoon, with heavy 
precipitation causing huge increases in both peak 
discharge rates and sediment loads of rivers. Where rivers 
are steep and flow rates are high, the sediment-rich 
water is highly erosive, which creates a positive feedback 
between erosion and sediment transport. In flatter and 
calmer downstream sections, the sediment is deposited, 
which results in silting of river channels, floodplains 
and deltas, irrigation channels and reservoirs, and 
changes in the course of river channels. The sediment 
load is dominated by material derived from natural mass 
wasting, which includes soil erosion. In mountainous 
and hilly terrain, soil erosion generally increases from 
west to east in the HKH region and is most pronounced 
along the southern flanks.
This pattern largely reflects trends in precipitation in the 
region, being highest where precipitation is high.116 
There are arguments that downstream flooding is being 
exacerbated by human activities upstream, such as 
forest clearance and livestock grazing, but these have 
only small local effects compared to the massive scale 
of natural mass wasting. Nevertheless, societies living in 
flood-prone downstream sections of rivers may blame 
communities located farther upstream for the worsening 
flooding.117 
As noted in Section 1 above, there is considerable 
evidence that many of the HKH region glaciers are 
melting. As glaciers melt and retreat, lakes commonly 
form behind the newly exposed terminal moraine (a 
ridge of stony deposits). The rapid accumulation of 
water in these lakes can lead to a breach of the moraine 
dam.118 The resultant rapid discharge of huge amounts 
of water and debris is known as a glacial-lake outburst 
flood (GLOF).119 These sudden releases can form 
dangerous flood waves of water mixed with morainic 
materials, which can be devastating to downstream 
riparian communities, hydropower stations and other 
infrastructure. Although effects of events are relatively 
localised, they could eventually present an increasing 
cost in terms of lives, property and infrastructure in 
India, Nepal and China.120 
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There is also a history of such outburst floods from 
Karakoram glaciers. However, the problem here is caused 
by advancing glaciers that form unstable ice dams. More 
than 60 glaciers of intermediate-to-large size (10 to 65 
kilometres in length) have a history of advancing into 
and interfering with tributaries of the upper Indus and 
Yarkand rivers. Not all are known to have created actual 
dams, but at least 30 have done so and involved outburst 
floods of exceptional size and destructiveness. The 
most urgent questions today involve some Karakoram 
valleys whose glaciers have created ice dams and 
catastrophic outburst floods in the past and that are now 
advancing.121 While this issue is regarded as a “minor 
hazard” at present, it is an issue from a more systems 
perspective that might require further attention and 
understanding, and, hence, warrants inclusion in a list of 
potential environmental hazards.
Many Himalayan basins are reporting rapidly expanding 
lakes, as glaciers melt and retreat. A remarkable 
example is Lake Imja Tsho in the Dudh Koshi sub-basin 
(Khumbu–Everest region). While this lake was virtually 
non-existent in 1960, it now covers an area of almost 
one square kilometre, and the Imja glacier which feeds it 
is retreating at an unprecedented 74m per year (between 
2001 and 2006). Similar observations have been made 
in the Pho Chu basin of the Bhutan Himalaya, where 
the change in size of some glacial lakes has been as 
high as 800% over the past forty years. At present, 
several supraglacial ponds on the Thorthormi glacier are 
growing quickly and merging. These lakes pose a threat 
because of their proximity to other large glacial lakes 
in the Pho Chu sub-basin where, in a worst-case GLOF 
scenario, they could cascade on to these other lakes with 
catastrophic consequences.122 
Earthquakes
Earthquakes pose a very significant hazard in the HKH 
region (as outlined in Section 1 and Figure 3 above). 
While seismic activity is frequent in many areas it is of 
low magnitude most of the time. For example, every 
year in Nepal alone there are more than a thousand 
earthquakes ranging in magnitude from 2 to 5. With the 
last major earthquake in 1934, another large event in 
Nepal is likely soon. Kathmandu, for example, is highly 
vulnerable and studies anticipate over 135,000 casualties 
and destruction of at least 60% of the city’s buildings.123 
The city is so vulnerable because it has been built on 
ancient lake sediments, which liquefy under severe 
ground shaking, and has undergone rapid unplanned 
development in recent years. Earthquakes pose an 
especially great hazard to dams, whether these are 
natural or artificial. Lakes and reservoirs may burst as a 
consequence of dam failure or overtopping. Earthquakes 
can also create natural dams (e.g. in the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake) which may subsequently fail.
Mass movements
Landslides induced by rainfall are common in the HKH 
region, and many landslides occur during the summer 
monsoon.124 Earthquakes and extreme weather events 
combine with the mountainous terrain to generate 
mass movements, such as avalanches, rock falls and 
debris flows, which may dam rivers. These dams 
may subsequently fail or be overtopped, leading to 
catastrophic flooding. As recently as 2008, the earthquake 
in the Sichuan Province of China highlighted the hazard 
associated with such dams, particularly around the city 
of Beichuan (see Figure 11), which is being relocated as 
a consequence of the damage caused by the earthquake 
and associated landslides. 
Debris falling from a mountainside into a lake may 
cause a lake surge and flash flooding downstream. In 
1841 a large section of the west side of Nanga Parbat 
collapsed into the Indus River, the downstream material 
from which dammed the river and created a lake some 
50 kilometres long. The subsequent failure of the dam 
Figure	11:	Satellite	images	of	Beichuan	before	
and	after	the	earthquake	of	May	2008
Note:  These images show the impact of the magnitude 7.9 earthquake that struck 
the Sichuan Province of China on 12 May 2008. The top image is from 14 May 
2006, and the bottom image is from 14 May 2008. Several landslides, a collapsed 
bridge and a bridge submerged by a newly formed lake can be seen. Formosat 
image © 2008 Dr Cheng-Chien Liu, National Cheng-Kung University and Dr 
An-Ming Wu, National Space Organization, Taiwan. Downloaded from http://
earthobservatory.nasa.gov.
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several months later caused flooding up to a distance of 
150 kilometres.125 
Hazards in deltas and coastal zones
Coastal erosion occurs to varying degrees along the 
coastline of Asia because it depends largely on the 
regional tectonic regime, the rate of sediment supply 
and sea-level rise, the intensity of wind, wave and storm 
activity, and the extent of human modification of the 
environment. Wetlands have been hugely modified by 
sedimentation and changes in land use, often resulting 
from logging to make way for development projects. Of 
particular note is the loss of a substantial portion of the 
mangroves in South and Southeast Asia as a consequence 
of human activities during the second half of the 
twentieth century.126 
Most deltas in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and China 
have experienced a decline in precipitation and an 
increase in droughts. This is exacerbated by upstream 
damming of rivers and overuse of groundwater, and 
has resulted in the drying up of wetlands and the severe 
degradation of ecosystems.127 This degradation includes 
mangroves being destroyed as a consequence of reduced 
flow of fresh water and increased sea-water intrusion 
in the coastal zone.128 Saltwater from the Bay of Bengal 
is reported to have penetrated at least 100km inland 
along tributary channels during the dry season. Severe 
droughts and unregulated groundwater withdrawal have 
also resulted in sea-water intrusion in the coastal plains 
of China.129 Sea-water intrusion affects the quality of 
both drinking and irrigation waters.
The coastlines in monsoon Asia are particularly 
vulnerable to windstorm and storm surges, as about 42% 
of the world’s tropical cyclones occur in this region.130 
The frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones 
originating in the Pacific have increased since the 1950s, 
whereas the frequency of those forming in the Bay of 
Bengal has decreased since 1970, but their intensity has 
increased.131 An increase of surface temperature of the 
sea of 2–4°C relative to current thresholds may cause 
an increase in cyclone intensity of 10–20%,132 which is 
likely to amplify heights of storm surges and associated 
coastal inundation and damage. In 1762 the eastern 
side of the Bay of Bengal experienced an earthquake of 
possible magnitude 8.8, which was associated with the 
Myanmar subduction zone off the coast of Myanmar. 
A recent study suggests that another event of similar 
magnitude may occur within 200 years and that the 
seismically active zone may extend beneath the Bengal 
fan.133 Such an event could produce tsunami associated 
with ground movement or submarine landslides, and 
these could have a profound impact on the coastlines of 
Myanmar, Bangladesh and India, particularly the Ganges 
delta where 60 million people live within 10 metres of 
present sea level. 
Hazards in deltas and coastal zones are likely to be 
magnified by higher sea levels. While the IPCC in 2007 
estimated that global sea levels would increase by at 
least 180–590 mm by the end of the 21st century, 134 
more recent studies have increased these projections. 
More recent estimates are that sea levels will rise from 
80–200cm. 135 In coastal areas of Asia, the current rate of 
sea-level rise is reported to be 1–3mm per year, which 
is slightly above the global average.136 The 2007 IPCC 
projections assumed a sea-level increase of 400mm by 
2100, and has been estimated that the increase in the 
annual number of people flooded in coastal regions of 
South, Southeast and East Asia would rise from 13 to 
94 million, with 60% of those affected being located 
along the coasts of Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh 
and Myanmar.137 Greater impacts, using the new data, 
have not yet been determined, but they are likely to be 
significant.
Arsenic contamination
The composition of water is mostly controlled by the 
chemistry of the minerals that partially or completely 
dissolve into it. Many elements are essential to life within 
certain concentration limits, but otherwise represent an 
excess or a deficiency. Arsenic is a well-known toxin that 
occurs naturally in the environment. In their seminal 
work on arsenic pollution, Ravenscroft and colleagues138 
state that the use of arsenic-contaminated groundwater 
by many tens of millions of people worldwide, many 
of whom are now showing signs of chronic arsenicosis, 
represents a huge disaster.
More people are affected by arsenic poisoning in Asia 
than in the rest of the world combined, and possibly 
over 100 million people drink water containing more 
than 10ppb arsenic in Asia.139 There are similar patterns 
of groundwater contamination in a near-continuous 
zone extending from the Indus River in Pakistan east 
to Taiwan – the South and Southeast Asian Arsenic Belt 
(SSAAB). Outside this belt, it is only the inland alluvial 
basins of Inner Mongolia, Shanxi and Xinjiang in China 
where arsenic pollution occurs on a similar scale.140 
As shown in Figure 12, arsenic pollution is mainly 
associated with alluvial deposits in the basins of the 
major rivers that flow south and east of the Himalaya 
and Tibetan Plateau. The poisoning of tens of millions 
of Asians with arsenic is indeed one of the greatest 
disasters of all time. Without widespread and sustainable 
solutions the problem may well increase, particularly 
as water stress is predicted to increase in the future in 
many of the regions where groundwater is seriously 
contaminated with arsenic.
Fires and atmospheric brown clouds
The intensity and spread of forest fires throughout Asia 
has increased over the past two decades, and is linked 
to rising temperature and declining precipitation in 
combination with increasingly intense clearance and use 
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of land.141 This trend is likely to worsen in future and 
presents a major atmospheric hazard. Forest fires and 
other sources of dark particulates (such as automobiles, 
coal-fired power stations and wood-burning stoves) 
produce atmospheric brown clouds, which are most 
pronounced in a band that stretches from the Arabian 
Peninsula to eastern China. South Asia and the northern 
Indian Ocean are particularly affected, and a haze three 
kilometres thick resides here between October and May 
(see Figure 13). 
Brown clouds may warm the local atmosphere, as 
they absorb solar radiation, but they generally cool 
the region below them by blocking and reflecting 
solar radiation. This cooling is problematic because it 
lessens the summer monsoon rainfall by reducing the 
amount of evaporation. India’s rice harvest, for example, 
would be at least 10% higher if the detrimental effects 
of the brown clouds were removed, and higher still 
if the negative effects of global warming were also 
removed.142 The brown clouds also deposit dark particles 
and aerosols on the surfaces of glaciers, which causes 
them to melt faster because they reflect less and absorb 
more solar energy. The overall increase in dark surfaces 
in the HKH region, because of both the loss of ice 
and the coating of ice with dark particulates, is one of 
the reasons why its high elevations are warming at an 
alarming rate.
From	crisis	drivers	to	crises
It is probably impossible to suggest with any accuracy 
the numbers of variables that could combine to trigger 
humanitarian crises in the HKH region, now or in future. 
Uncertainty surrounding the impact of climate change 
and future water availability makes predictions even 
more problematic. Nevertheless, there are indications of 
plausible developments that could either create large-
scale humanitarian crises or reflect their consequences. 
These include food insecurity, mass displacement, 
habitat and infrastructure collapse, demise of livelihoods, 
changing disease patterns and a rise in conflict. These 
themes are considered in the remainder of this section.
Food insecurity
In various ways the interaction between natural 
phenomena and human activity in the HKH region 
could create levels of food insecurity that would directly 
affect the lives of at least 280 million people, and 
indirectly many more, in less than fifteen years. Unless 
there are major improvements in water efficiency and 
management it is likely that water shortages will in 
the longer term lead to major food shortages in some 
regions. 
Salinisation of the soil may become an increasing 
problem, and the capacities of dams to provide water for 
irrigation purposes will be ever more problematic due 
to increased silting. Brown clouds will continue to affect 
monsoons potentially affecting agricultural production. 
Irrigation is likely to be increasingly dependent upon 
groundwater extraction. In turn, this extraction will 
depend upon fossil-fuel-powered pumps that will boost 
the cost of agricultural produce. 
A growing proportion of the HKH region is likely to be 
dependent upon expensive agricultural produce coming 
from sources well outside the region. As dams continue 
to threaten the variable and complex ecosystem of the 
Mekong River, the future environmental and social 
effects could be monumental. 
Mass displacement
A combination of infrastructure development, lack 
of potable water, the flooding of deltas, riverbeds 
and coastal areas, the threats of potential or ongoing 
Figure	12:	Populations	at	risk	from	arsenic-
polluted	groundwater	
Source: Royal Geographical Society; downloaded from www.rgs.org on 4 August 
2009. 
Figure	13:	Atmospheric	brown	cloud	along	the	
front	of	the	Himalaya	and	through	Bangladesh	
Source: Image courtesy of NASA.
28 The waters of the Third Pole
conflicts, and the sale of agricultural lands for industrial 
purposes may result in the movement of millions of 
indigenous peoples in and outside the HKH region.143 
The consequences of this potential displacement would 
be threefold. 
1  A regional concentration of new forms of 
‘refugees’ – mass movements of economic 
and environmentally induced migrants. These 
populations would almost certainly spread into 
neighbouring countries within the HKH region or 
outside it, and compete for resources and livelihood 
opportunities. There are likely to be potentially 
large holding areas for refugees as well as growing 
prospects of refugee-related conflict. 
2  A rise in internal displacement which, as is already 
evident, could fuel internal conflict. India is but one 
example of this where intra-state conflict between 
environmentally displaced people is regarded as yet 
another crisis driver for the country.144
3  International and regional impact on urban and 
semi-urban conurbations. Slums of unparalleled 
proportions would become sources of disease 
and extreme malnutrition, threatening the lives 
of millions within them, while at the same time 
promoting pathogens that could spread into urban 
conurbations more widely.145 
Habitat and infrastructure collapse
Dam construction and related hydroelectric power 
generation have in many ways become the symbol 
of future large-scale crises in the HKH region. The 
interaction between silting, the expansion of dam 
construction and earthquakes is but one example of how 
communities depending upon modern infrastructure 
could be faced with serious life-threatening situations.
Four of the major mega-cities in the HKH region 
are located near large bodies of water – rivers, the 
sea or deltas – leaving the insubstantial housing and 
infrastructure found in these cities’ vast slums subject 
to collapse. In the wake of a flood, millions of people 
in Mumbai, Dhaka, Karachi or Shanghai could find 
themselves with no access to potable water, sanitation 
facilities or shelter.
The hydroelectric power that sustains a high proportion 
of the region’s villages, towns and cities also is based on 
a set of precarious assumptions about the consistency 
of water flows. However, increasingly serious stream-
flow variations, diversion of rivers and the upstream 
control of dam release means that the water necessary 
for habitats and livelihoods is by no means reliable, and 
can affect access to basic services such as potable water, 
sanitation and the most basic health care.
Livelihood challenges
Many parts of Asia have to deal with a complex paradox. 
While wealth creation has generated considerable 
wealth for many, at the same time the livelihoods of a 
significant proportion of people in the same societies 
are precarious. Across the HKH region there are serious 
threats to livelihoods within rural and urban areas. 
Increasingly, while some who migrate to urban areas 
may prosper and share income with families in rural 
areas, many of those millions of people who have 
abandoned the countryside for the city may struggle to 
gain access to employment. There are already indications 
that unemployment in urban areas is increasing, 
resulting in deep destitution with little state capacity to 
provide any consistent assistance. Without livelihoods 
in urban areas, a growing number of people are also 
without consistent access to clean water, as potable water 
remains a purchasable commodity throughout most 
urban areas in the region.
The situation in rural areas is equally precarious, 
and there is little reason to expect any significant 
improvement over the next two decades. Extreme climate 
events are likely to continue destroying crops, depleting 
water resources, causing losses in livestock, cropland, 
and agricultural productivity, and destroying the meagre 
infrastructure present, thus reducing market access and 
access to public services. Traditional livelihoods in the 
region have for many people depended upon migration 
– for agriculturalists as well as agro-pastoralists. In the 
future, population numbers in addition to increasing 
land degradation and political sensitivities mean that this 
form of survival strategy will be less and less available to 
those in search of livelihoods.
Changing disease patterns
In general, water throughout the HKH region is 
increasingly subject to a host of pollutants, natural 
and human-made. Of the former, as noted above in 
this section, arsenic poisoning is a potential threat 
throughout the region. Analysts suggest that this ‘natural 
poisoning’ is already beginning to affect tens of millions 
of Asians, and there is every indication that this crisis 
threat will intensify with growing water stress.
Yet, the admixture of collapsed infrastructure and 
habitat, poverty, food insecurity, non-potable water and 
lack of sanitation could be the source of major epidemics 
that would sweep through extensive areas of mega-cities 
across the HKH region. Traditional diseases, including 
cholera and typhoid, could join with new virus strains 
to affect millions of people in slum and non-slum 
environments. Such patterns of disease would be carried 
further through displaced communities seeking survival 
within and outside the HKH region. The foreseeable 
capacities in the region to anticipate and deal with 
potential epidemics would appear limited.
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Rising conflict 
Almost all of the major rivers that originate in the 
Himalaya traverse several different countries. The Indus 
River originates in Tibet and flows through India into 
Pakistan; the Sutlej River rises near Mansorovar in 
Tibet, crosses India and Pakistan and meets the Chenab 
and the Indus; the major rivers of Nepal originate in 
the Himalaya and flow into India to meet the Ganges, 
which itself flows on to Bangladesh; the Tsangpo River 
originates in Tibet, flows into Arunachal Pradesh in 
India as the Siang (Dihang) River, then into Assam as the 
Brahmaputra, finally flowing on to Bangladesh, where it 
is called the Jamuna River.
The transboundary nature of the rivers, combined with 
the uncertain impacts of future dam construction, is 
likely to raise the risk of conflict in a region already 
fraught with cross-border tensions. Pakistan and India 
have already clashed over the Baglihar dam on the 
Chenab, while Chinese development of the upper 
reaches of the Mekong River and other countries 
projects on the lower Mekong have sparked popular 
outrage in South-East Asia. A more worrying long-
term prospect is a possible plan by China to dam the 
main course of the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) river in 
Tibet, which could result in serious confrontation with 
India. In the absence of any transboundary regulatory 
framework, disagreements and misunderstandings over 
dam construction could become flashpoints for future 
conflict, especially in a situation of water scarcity.
Considerable attention has been given to the prospect 
of inter-state ‘water wars’ involving in one way or 
another Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, India, Nepal and 
Pakistan.. However, far less attention has been given 
to the nature of intra-state conflict within these same 
countries. In China alone, it has been reported that 
domestic uprisings have continued to increase in protest 
about water management or water-quality issues. Xinhua 
News reported that more than 50,000 environmentally 
related protests occurred in China in 2005, slightly 
more than half of which were about water pollution 
issues.148 Conflicts are occurring between factories and 
farming communities as well as between upstream and 
downstream water users. In India, too, many analysts 
also point to an increased in intra-state conflict that will 
lead to large-scale communal violence.
This is not to suggest that initiatives have not been 
taken to address such future conflicts. However, it is 
evident – if one takes the Mekong River Commission 
as a case in point – that the pressures throughout the 
HKH region for ensuring domestic water interests can 
transcend individual countries’ commitments to sound 
transboundary water management. 
Case	study	5:		Water	disputes	of	the	future
In what may become the biggest water-diversion plan in history, China plans to divert water from the 
south and west to bring water to the dry North China Plain. This $65 billion plan will divert 45 billion 
cubic metres of water per year – roughly the average annual flow of the Yellow River – along three 
channels in eastern, central and western China.146 The western route draws water from Tongtianhe, 
Yalongjiang and Daduhe, tributaries of the Yangtze River in southwest China, feeding the upper reaches 
of the Yellow River in efforts to alleviate water shortage in the northwestern regions. The central 
route is to fetch water from the Danjiangkou Reservoir on the border between Hubei and Henan 
provinces to supply Beijing and Tianjin. The eastern route draws water at Yangzhou on the lower 
reaches of the Yangtze, flowing northward through a section of the Grand Canal and several lakes to 
reach Hebei and Tianjin. 
India, like China, is contemplating its own potentially disastrous schemes for water diversion. The most 
ambitious part of its Interlinking of Rivers Project, the Himalayan section, would move water from 
the upper parts of the Ganges, Yamuna and Brahmaputra Rivers westward, ending in the Luni and 
Sabarmati Rivers in Rajasthan and Gujarat. This would break India’s formal promises to Bangladesh, 
including a written understanding of 1996, that no water would be diverted away from the Ganges 
above the barrage at Farakka, a few kilometres from the India–Bangladesh border. Official estimates 
for the cost of this project in total, with 260 links between rivers, are of $120–200 billion. Plans for 
the project have been shrouded in even greater secrecy than with China’s river-diversion projects. It is 
estimated that the number of people displaced will be 5.5 million.147 
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A	matrix	of	interactions
The sorts of interactions between natural phenomena 
and human activities described in this section are by 
no means unique. They represent global phenomena 
with parallels elsewhere. However, in terms of potential 
crisis drivers of the future and their impacts, the likely 
consequences for the HKH region probably have few 
parallels in terms of the numbers of potentially affected 
people and the complexities of the crises that in various 
ways the meltwaters and declining recharge rates may 
well trigger. While it remains difficult to pinpoint 
numbers of potentially affected people, the complexities 
that would generate such future crises are outlined in 
Figure 14.
	Figure	14:	Crisis	Drivers	in	the	HKH	region
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An	uncertain	future
Sources of Survival – Sources of Threat poses questions about 
what might be and points to the very real possibility of 
disastrous humanitarian implications from the diverse 
types and scale of multiple disasters occurring at any 
one time in a highly vulnerable region of the world. It 
focuses on the issue of water as a vital resource and a 
potential crisis driver in the region. The report warns 
that natural hazards, particularly those relating to water 
quantity and quality, will continue to hamper socio-
economic development and poverty reduction and 
could contribute to international conflict. This danger is 
highlighted below, in part II under the sub-heading, The 
Changing dynamics of humanitarian crises where one expert in 
water-related violence points up that the historic world 
hotspot for water conflict may have switched from the 
Middle East to Asia today. Sources of Survival – Sources of 
Threat is a study in humanitarian futures, and is not 
intended as a commentary on the science that underpins 
those expert views. Its objective is to energise those 
with humanitarian roles and responsibilities to look for 
greater clarity about the future and to begin preparing 
for potential future challenges which we can anticipate. 
There is much that remains uncertain and unknown 
about potential humanitarian threats across the HKH 
region. Yet, at the same time, there is ample expert 
opinion to suggest that the region offers a plethora 
of humanitarian threats that could severely affect the 
lives and livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people. 
To date Asia experiences 37% of the world’s natural 
disasters, 55% of the deaths they cause and estimated 
annual rate of US$98 billion worth of economic damage 
since 2000.149 With this in mind, it is telling that in 
India, for example, there is a firm belief among well 
positioned experts that ‘future types of crises [will be] 
fundamentally different, with the consequence that past 
knowledge, experience and systems of coping will no 
longer be relevant. In part this relates to unprecedented 
scale, but [also to the] difference between the nature 
of threats emerging, in particular from climate change 
and environmental degradation, and those that have 
previously been seen, that “we will have no wisdom 
from the past to rely on”.’150 
In looking to the future, it is increasingly evident 
that globally the types as well as the dimensions 
and dynamics of humanitarian crises may increase 
exponentially. There is every reason to assume that this 
spectre will also relate to the HKH region and more 
specifically to the issue of water. As outlined below, 
under preparing for humanitarian futures, the factors that 
are affecting the types, dimensions and dynamics of 
humanitarian threats are as relevant to the HKH as they 
are elsewhere. And yet, given what those experts in 
the region and others regard as plausible threats, it is 
disconcerting to note that the perspective and indeed 
action necessary to prepare for such longer-term threats 
appear to be severely constrained by what will be 
described under the present state of play by factors ranging 
from inadequate knowledge and knowledge sharing to 
institutional short-termism.
In no sense, however, is this to suggest that regional 
organisations such as ASEAN or the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 
governments, research institutions and non-
governmental and community-based organisations 
in the region are oblivious to the region’s water 
vulnerabilities.151 To the contrary, considerable energy 
and efforts have been devoted in the past to address 
evident threats and consider the prospects for having to 
deal with those that are less evident. And yet, given the 
growing complexity, dimensions and dynamics of crises 
created by and affecting water, the question remains, “Is 
enough being done to meet such future humanitarian 
challenges?”152 
Preparing	for	humanitarian	futures:	
dimensions	and	dynamics	of	future	
humanitarian	crises
The dimensions and dynamics of future humanitarian 
crises that are increasingly apparent in a more global 
context are clearly relevant to the HKH region. This 
would seem evident when reflecting on the changing 
nature of humanitarian crises and hence their 
consequent dimensions and dynamics. 
The changing nature of humanitarian crises. 
Uncertainty, rapid change and complexity will 
increasingly be the hallmarks of humanitarian crises in 
the foreseeable future. The foreseeable future is likely to 
reflect new sets of sudden and slow-onset crisis agents, 
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including technological systems failures, large-scale 
industrial and chemical collapse, pollution, nuclear 
seepage, water scarcity and pandemics.
In China, for example, experts suggest that “various crises 
are perceived as growing in both intensity and frequency, 
and are regarded as now posing serious obstacles to 
national economic and social development….The 
combined factors of climate change, rapid economic 
development and accelerating urbanization mean 
that tackling and preventing future crises has become 
increasingly complex.”153 Throughout the region, 
potential crisis drivers such as the interaction between 
dams, water volume and earthquakes and arsenic 
contamination are being added to a growing catalogue 
of new types of crisis drivers as well as expanded types 
of traditional drivers.
However, much of the analysis of new and traditional 
crisis drivers continues to be done in sectoral isolation, 
and the potential consequence of their interaction is too 
rarely explored.
The changing dynamics of humanitarian crises. 
More and more future crises will be interactive, global, 
synchronous, simultaneous and sequential. The inter-
relationship between natural hazards and political 
events such as violent conflict will become more overt 
and probably more frequent. Growing concerns about 
the implications of lack of adequate water supplies in 
at least 40 states around the world is a clear case in 
point where the correlation between the depletion of 
a natural resource and the prospect for violence seems 
increasingly clear. 
In the words of one expert concerned with water-
related violence, “While the Middle East has the longest 
history of water-related violence by far, my biggest 
worries today are elsewhere: in Asia, where pollution, 
massive population growth, serious over-allocation 
and inefficient use of water, weak institutions, and 
exceedingly complex political relationships combine in 
a volatile mix.”154 This is not to ignore efforts that have 
been made by two of the largest powers in the region – 
China and India – to address these, nor in this context 
the efforts made by Pakistan and India at the declaratory 
level to deal with their common water problems.155 
However, it is to say that in all these efforts there appears 
little discussion on the emerging dimensions and 
dynamics of humanitarian crises.
The prospect of synchronous failures, or, systems collapse, 
for example, is increasing globally, and is a phenomenon 
that will also impact upon the HKH region. The more 
economic, infrastructural and social systems become 
dependent upon factors such as internet technology and 
globalisation, the more systems become vulnerable to 
temporary or permanent collapse. A crisis driver such as 
volcanic ash as evidenced in 2010 can undermine one 
system, the airline industry, which in turn can spill over 
into others, such as tourism and insurance, and have not 
only regional but global effects. 
The HKH region is equally prone to such synchronous 
failures as a result of systems’ collapse within the region 
and externally. Spiralling food and fuel prices due to 
actions outside the region could undermine the stability 
of many countries within the region, itself.156 This sort 
of synchronous failure could in turn readily result in 
very high levels of starvation, breakdown of urban water 
sources and result in severe community violence.157 
Similarly cybernetic manipulation which takes  
“power stations off line” would have disastrous 
consequences for dams and hydro-electric facilities 
within countries of the region and in some instances 
cross-regionally.158
While ASEAN and SAARC among others continue to 
explore measures to deal with crises that might affect the 
region, little attention has been given to the implications 
of major crises that could occur simultaneously. This has 
at least three implications. Firstly, though the realities 
of regional cooperation are far more limited than 
the rhetoric that often precedes it, there are serious 
initiatives to promote cooperation.159 If and when such 
regional cooperation becomes a more established reality, 
members will have to determine how best to deal with 
major crises that occur at the same time. How, in other 
words, would regional actors working in cooperation 
deal with the impact of a major flood affecting the India-
Pakistan borders at the same time a cyclone hits the 
coastline of Bangladesh?
Secondly, for those countries that are all too familiar with 
multiple disasters occurring simultaneously, they may 
well appreciate the difficulties of prioritising response 
from a humanitarian perspective. In light of the types 
of water-driven crises that could occur in the majority 
of the states in the HKH region, there is little indication 
that either contingency planning or response reflects the 
prospect of the simultaneous events that could ensue in 
any single country in the region. 
The third issue concerns the possible support role 
which external actors – international humanitarian 
organisations - might play when confronted with two 
competing crises in the HKH region, each of which 
might require substantial assistance. It is far from 
implausible to suggest that in the foreseeable future 
an intense tropical storm would strike from the Bay of 
Bengal at the same time as extremely heavy monsoon 
rains – after several months of severe drought –  
causing major floods inland. The total affected 
populations could reach the tens of millions, and it is 
probable that many of these people would seek refuge 
in neighbouring India. How and in what ways could 
the international community support two simultaneous 
calamities on that scale, with all the ensuing 
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complexities, involving refugee movements, internal 
displacement and catastrophic flood? 
The implications of sequential crises for the HKH region 
are considerable, and could be triggered by a range of 
factors, from an earthquake that destroys a dam which, 
causing flood waters to wreak havoc in riverine areas, in 
turn leading to mass migration. Indeed one speculative 
scenario suggests that in less than two decades time the 
effect of dam construction in China, Cambodia , Laos 
and Vietnam might well result in dramatic changes to 
the Lancang (Upper Mekong) River’s unique cycle of 
flood and drought - the annual flood pulse – which in 
turn could wreck the area’s delicate eco-system. The 
consequence of that threat would be to destroy the 
fishing industry upon which millions of people depend 
for their survival. 
This, according to the futures scenario attached to this 
report, could well lead to climate refugees, resulting in 
desperate attempts by governments such as Cambodia to 
close their borders against “refugee hordes” and would 
stretch the capacities of cities such as Ho Chi Minh City 
to cope with the disease and discontent that might well 
ensue from mass influx.160
The	present	state	of	play
Many of the crisis drivers that do or could affect the 
region are politically sensitive. This is markedly so when 
it comes to the control, diversion and damming of 
rivers. Nevertheless, given the sensitivity that surrounds 
these and related issues, one also has to recognise the 
considerable efforts that continue to be made to come 
to terms with such threats.161 So, from the perspective 
of vulnerability to crises, there are persistent concerns 
that have emerged from interviews and literature reviews 
about the serious gaps in prevention, preparedness and 
response planning. These concerns fall into five general 
categories:
1.  Governments short term-ism. “The action of the 
Chinese government is driven by crises, rather 
than tackling the problem head on through 
comprehensive prevention and mitigation,” noted 
the President of the Institute of Environmental 
Studies at Renmin University in Beijing. There is 
a tendency for the government to cover up the 
sources of problems such as water pollution, and, 
hence, “The more we [the Government] repress 
the problem, the more severe it will become in 
the future!...The decision making mechanisms 
of the Chinese government need to be greatly 
improved.”162
 Such criticisms are by no means unique to 
governments of the region, but clearly apply in 
one way or another to them. The inclination of 
governments to pursue short-term objectives, and 
to think in terms of maintaining economic growth 
at the expense of creating secure longer-term 
environments is possibly understandable, but explains 
in part why there appears to be no long-term 
integrated planning for dealing with humanitarian 
threats on a country-wide or regional basis.  2. 
Stove-piped planning processes. In Pakistan as is 
often the case elsewhere, authorities’ fixation on 
burgeoning urban populations such as those of 
Karachi has meant that water decisions have all too 
often been taken in isolation, with a lack of a holistic 
analysis about the intersection between urban and 
rural water needs. Preoccupation with dam building 
in 2008 had reputedly cost Pakistan over $12.6 
billion dollars without improving to any significant 
extent the country’s downstream distribution 
infrastructures. 163 These sorts of issues are but 
examples of isolated planning processes in which 
technocratic and engineering solutions are adopted in 
isolation, divorced from context as well as from other 
sectoral concerns.
 Governments’ tendencies to stove-pipe analysis 
and solutions may be easy targets, but they are 
not alone in their compartmentalised perspectives. 
Regional organisations have generally moved 
from one issue area to another – eg, water and 
development, climate change and their impacts 
upon water – without connecting the two in terms 
of vulnerability analyses. Such perspectives have not 
been able to capture adequately the range of factors 
that need to be taken into account to assess potential 
crisis drivers and their possible impact upon 
vulnerability. 
3. Local adaptation and knowledge. While 
international, regional and national cooperation 
is crucial, local levels are also central to an 
understanding of vulnerable populations and 
to ensure that those populations are able to 
adapt and adequately cope with the uncertainty 
and insecurity brought existing and emerging 
crisis drivers. The potential of community-led 
adaptation is increasingly recognised as critical 
for reducing vulnerability. More and more, good 
practice and principles emphasise the importance 
of empowering communities to base adaptations 
to current and forthcoming crises on their own 
knowledge and decision-making processes, with 
support from outsiders. For example, farmers in 
flood prone areas of Bangladesh build their houses 
on stilts. Tibet nomads have already noticed the 
earlier spring and moved yaks to alpine meadows 
earlier accordingly and Nepali farmers store crop 
seeds for recovery after natural disasters. The 
considerable diversity of local cultures and coping 
mechanisms are vital in the development of effective 
prevention, preparedness and response strategies. 
They as well as indigenous coping mechanisms 
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need to be reflected in the holistic humanitarian 
strategies that will be essential for dealing with 
future humanitarian crises.
 Government policies in the region, however, tend 
to have a narrow sectoral focus. For example, road 
construction in Nepal has increased market access 
and thereby supported new livelihoods, but has 
destroyed many traditional streams and wells, 
reducing local ability to cope with drought. In 
many areas, restoration programmes following 
droughts have simply reconstructed buildings in 
high-risk flood zones. This is not to suggest that 
authorities should adopt a laissez-faire attitude 
towards addressing vulnerabilities. To the contrary, 
prevention programmes, for example, should 
involve activities such as livelihoods diversification, 
disaster risk reduction, improving water efficiency, 
and increasing local access to markets and public 
services. In order to succeed however, such measures 
must use approaches that reflect local cultures and 
traditions. If on the other hand such local support 
interventions are not integrated into wider policy 
making processes the effects of these policies will be 
short-lived.164
4 Information sharing failures and knowledge gaps. 
The issue of local knowledge and adaptation directly 
feeds into the glaring issue of knowledge gaps and 
information sharing throughout the region. While, 
for example, the global climate change debate has 
made a significant shift from focusing on mitigation 
of greenhouse gas emissions to increasing awareness 
of the importance of adaptation, there is still a gap 
in research on local adaptation processes, and the 
factors enabling or constraining them.165 Issues such 
as the downstream effects of changing water flow 
regimes in Himalayan rivers require more extensive 
research. Few, if any studies have attempted to 
model the impact of a 30–50% reduction in dry 
season flow on, for example, downstream economic 
growth, livelihood conditions, and urban water 
use.166 
 In a related vein, policy-makers and scientists at an 
international, regional and national levels need to 
be more open to a new range of expertise informed 
by the insights of vulnerable communities, local 
stakeholders and development and disaster-risk 
reduction practitioners, rather than restricted to 
impacts-based scientific inputs arising from global 
or national models alone.167 At the same time, 
insufficient time is spent by regional organisations 
and governments on developing policies based 
on social and natural science expertise to offset 
potential future humanitarian crises. Conferences 
and workshops within the region are plentiful 
when it comes to sectoral analyses – normally on 
a country-by-country basis – of issues that are 
possible natural hazards. There is, however, no 
established network of scientists and humanitarian 
policy-makers where dialogues can take place about 
ways to identify and mitigate future humanitarian 
threats.
 The sharing of information, too, is a problem in the 
region. Transboundary information is deemed to be 
highly sensitive by governments, and sharing it all 
too often is as much a political signal as a perceived 
functional necessity.168 At the same time, there 
have been an increased number of information-
sharing networks, including ICIMOD (International 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development) 
which focuses on the region’s mountain areas. 
However, none to date put humanitarian threats 
or vulnerability analyses in terms of longer-term 
perspectives at a regional level.
5.  Disjointed and incremental planning approaches to 
humanitarian crisis prevention, preparedness and 
response. The sorts of crises that the HKH region 
will have to face require prevention, preparedness 
and response measures that are more holistic and 
futures-oriented than is the case to date. While 
authorities in the HKH region are not alone when 
it comes to incremental and disjointed approaches 
to humanitarian crisis management, there has been 
little attempt to address the potential vulnerabilities 
of the region from a holistic, futures-oriented 
systems perspective. 
 The sorts of threats which the region will have to 
face will depend upon prevention and preparedness 
measures that focus on unfolding crises through a 
“vulnerability lens” over the timescale of several 
decades. The inter-relationships between climate 
trends, local coping mechanisms, agricultural and 
commercial initiatives, new technologies, socio-
economic structures and migration patterns need to 
be seen in other words in a way that integrates such 
key factors and which analyses how holistically they 
could increase the exposure of people to potential 
humanitarian threats. Only through such a lens 
will development as well as disaster management 
effectively address prevention and preparedness. 
 It is also important to recognise that disaster 
management in the region is well established, 
and is supported by the longest serving and well 
respected research and policy institutions in the 
world. Technologies, too, are available throughout 
the region that can “map” and monitor critical 
vulnerability exposure, and these are increasingly 
accessible, for example high and low resolution 
satellite data.169 
 In isolated pockets, cross-border water management, 
for example, has generated a number of bilateral and 
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multilateral initiatives. However, what is of concern 
from the humanitarian point of view is that these 
initiatives continue to be piece-meal, inadequately 
integrated from a sectoral perspective and without a 
coherent appreciation of the long-term perspective 
necessary for dealing with the sorts of complex 
crises one will have to face.
Humanitarian	consequences
There is a clear gulf between the scale of plausible 
humanitarian threats that may well affect the HKH 
region and the present state of play for dealing with 
such threats. There appears to be little investment in 
looking at the long-term implications of such threats in 
a way that is holistic and regional, that looks at possible 
threats and opportunities to mitigate them in ways that 
are systematic and coherent and in ways that are based 
on knowledge – both local and regional – that points to 
vulnerabilities and ways to address them.
In noting this, the report stresses that the types of crisis 
drivers that human kind will increasingly confront 
cannot be handled at the last moment, which is all too 
often the inclination of humanitarian organisations. 
Many future threats will require longer-term analysis 
and systems perspectives. Prevention and preparedness 
measures will be complex, and require in many instances 
holistic, inter-disciplinary understanding of cause and 
effect. There are significant disparities between the way 
that prevention and preparedness are undertaken now, 
and the sorts of challenges that may well threaten the 
lives of hundreds of millions of people in the foreseeable 
future.
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This report seeks to point out risks that need to be 
considered when dealing with the HKH region. It has 
tried not only to identify such risks, but also to highlight 
the initiatives undertaken to offset them. In exploring 
both, this report concludes that there is a great deal 
that must be done with considerable commitment and 
urgency to offset a variety of potential catastrophes that 
could threaten the region in the foreseeable future. 
Conclusions
1. The HKH region is already in a state of crisis. 
While there are indicators throughout the region 
that humanitarian crises are already taking place, 
their impacts on and implications for the region are 
often ignored, handled in geographic or sectoral 
isolation or inadequately understood. This is 
particularly the case for water where dramatically 
reduced availability in some areas, inefficient use 
of water, pollution and water diversion are already 
affecting directly and indirectly food production, 
migration and increased levels of disease.
2  The threat of the future. 
There are a growing number of experts in and 
outside the region who are concerned about the 
region’s prospects over the next two decades. 
Population rates are growing while the availability 
of potable water is becoming more problematic, 
and the means that have been used to offset that 
scarcity, such as river diversions, dams and intensive 
use of groundwater, could lead to ever more serious 
humanitarian threats without concerted efforts to 
address these at a regional level.
3 Intensification of insecurity. 
In a region already sadly familiar with conflict, 
further conflict could result from the natural and 
human-made pressures facing the HKH region over 
the next twenty years. Assuming that the present 
dam development and water diversion initiatives 
are brought to fruition , states large and small may 
find water becomes even more of a life-or-death 
calculation for their citizens and for the industries 
and agriculture supporting them. Hence, there is 
growing concern that the competition for water 
and the risk of large scale displacement due to 
water patterns will exacerbate tensions among the 
nations of the region. The prospect for trans-border 
tensions could be further intensified as Central Asian 
states such as Afghanistan and Uzbekistan become 
engaged in the competition for water. 
4  Development catastrophes. 
This report has emphasised the nexus between 
natural hazards and human intervention. It has 
been suggested that the development initiatives 
being undertaken throughout much of the 
region could lead to major crises. Have the rate 
and scale of development have made the region 
highly vulnerable to humanitarian crises on an 
unprecedented scale? Will the long-term impact 
of the region’s present approach to development 
be paid in searing vulnerabilities in the future 
through the effects, for example, of toxic waste 
contamination of existing waterways or the 
consequence of the largest number of dams in the 
world? 
 Like the other conclusions here, this is not a 
new idea. It is, however, all too apparent that the 
consequences of such vulnerabilities and direct 
human costs stemming from disasters, emergencies 
and catastrophes have not yet been adequately 
calculated. From this preliminary analysis, it is 
apparent that there have been inadequate efforts 
to quantify the potential types of calamities and 
their consequences in terms of affected and related 
costs regarding longer-term threats. This sort of 
consideration would seem to be a useful starting 
point for practical prevention and preparedness, as 
well as response planning.
5  Lack of effective water management. 
There is inadequate water management at almost 
every level in the HKH region. At the national level, 
water management is marked by short-termism, 
with seemingly little attention paid to the long-
term consequences of policies taken in sectoral 
and geographical isolation. From discussions with 
experts in China and India as well as in other 
research centres in the West, it would appear that 
policy all too often results from a combination of 
competing interests and decisions and plans taken in 
relative isolation. Further, the historic predisposition 
towards large-scale water-supply projects is deeply 
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embedded. This legacy, as much as short-term 
attitudes, constrains the political will to adopt 
alternative and more sustainable water management 
practices.
6  Lack of systems perspectives. 
A major factor continuing to inhibit a proper 
understanding of the region is the failure to adopt 
a systems perspective of regional issues. In order to 
understand and then appropriately manage water 
in the vast HKH region and its drainage basins, it is 
essential to take a fully integrated systems approach. 
This requires definition and quantification of the 
components of the system and the linkages and 
feedbacks between these components. In this, 
both the natural and human components must be 
defined, and the impact of change followed through 
the system.
7  Knowledge gaps and lack of understanding.  
It is evident that there are considerable uncertainties 
that remain unknown in the HKH region. It is 
evident that these knowledge gaps are due to the 
sheer enormity, complexity and vast diversity of the 
region. At the same time, these knowledge gaps are 
also due to gaps in technical capacities. Hence, for 
example, lack of knowledge of the causes of wetland 
degradation is due to the difficulties of gathering 
relevant data and accurate figures regarding 
amongst other things climate change impacts on 
precipitation levels. 
 Beyond the technical difficulties to be addressed 
to narrow knowledge gaps, there is also a 
considerable lack of understanding about the people 
of the region. As is all too evident in analyses of 
community vulnerability and solutions in other 
parts of the world, those who purport to understand 
threats and solutions of those in the HKH region 
often do not understand the linguistic, cultural 
and socio-economic differentiations that mark the 
region’s diverse populations. In that sense, there 
really is no adequate shared understanding about the 
region as a whole, no ‘map’ of potential risks and 
opportunities that would serve as a useful planning 
instrument.170 
8 Lack of coordinated, comprehensive research. 
While there are considerable pools of research on 
various aspects of the HKH region, data gathering 
and interpretation have been carried out without 
cohesion or continuity.171 Governments have 
failed to date to facilitate ways to bring together 
the considerable academic and policy research 
that is already available. At the same time, many 
research projects are still guilty of ‘selective science’, 
distorting findings to serve their own agendas.172 
Some projects, due to their particular bias or focus, 
fail to take into account a wider spectrum of factors 
involved in their analyses, sometimes with very 
serious potential consequences.173 
 Hence, an important issue to be addressed is how 
information flows between researchers and the 
information needs of those responsible for decision-
making and developing solutions. In addition to 
addressing the current gaps in knowledge through 
further research, there also needs to have a better 
understanding of what is already there, and of the 
information that could be obtained through better 
and more systematic analysis of existing data, in 
particular historical records. 
Recommendations
The recommendations that follow are intended 
to suggest ways to strengthen humanitarian crisis 
prevention and preparedness activities in a region that 
may become increasingly vulnerable to large-scale water-
related disasters and emergencies. There can be no doubt 
that these recommendations in some instances may run 
up against deeply rooted political, economic and cultural 
constraints; there, too, is evidence that in some instances 
these constraints are being overcome. In any event, the 
potential scale of threats to lives and livelihoods compel 
the authors to propose steps that should be taken now 
to mitigate the consequences of the types of future 
crises suggested in this report. The recommendations 
are focused on functional issues, and seek to engage 
humanitarian policy-makers and practitioners to address 
the region’s threats and opportunities – not in the 
context of individual countries, but from the perspective 
of an inter-related system. 
1. The HKH region must move up the planning 
agenda. In a world in which the types, dimensions 
and dynamics of humanitarian threats are predicted 
to increase substantially, the attention given to the 
potential vulnerabilities of a region that is home to 
20% of the world’s population has to increase. The 
issues that are likely to impact upon that region –
water-driven food insecurity, internal displacement, 
refugees, and potential conflict – all emphasise 
the importance of putting the region higher up 
on the ‘humanitarian agenda’. This means that a 
more concerted, coherent and cross-regional effort 
is required to identify the range of emerging and 
potential threats that the region will have to face. 
This recommendation does not ignore the growing 
number of initiatives that reflect an increased 
awareness about the region’s present and future 
hazards, but these in turn do not convey the urgency 
which many natural and social scientists within and 
outside the region increasingly feel is required.
2. Develop a new planning construct. The 
complexities which will underpin so many of the 
crisis drivers that may affect the region require 
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a new planning construct or framework. The 
proposed construct will have to have four core 
components: [i] vulnerability needs to be the main 
focus; [ii] a regional approach to vulnerability 
mapping in which natural flows of hazards and 
possible solutions are not delimited by national 
boundaries; [iii] greater attention to the interactive 
nature of future threats resulting in more integrated 
modelling; and [iv] preparedness planning based 
upon futures scenarios, including the consequence 
of synchronous failures and sequential and 
simultaneous crises.
3. Develop a new, non-intrusive means for 
international support. Over the past three decades, 
humanitarian organisations from the international 
community have become accustomed to intervening 
in “overseas crises” in ways that are seen in 
many instances as intrusive and disempowering. 
Governments in the region will be less amenable to 
such intrusive intervention – no matter how well 
intentioned. Concerned organisations outside the 
region will need to pay greater attention to non-
intrusive support. This would include [i] creation 
of humanitarian professionalisation programmes 
for sharing best practices and standards; [ii] means 
for regular sharing of data on regional dimensions 
of vulnerability; [iii] regionally-developed scenario 
exercises to assess and test appropriate approaches 
for international support for regional crises; [iv] 
pre-response arrangements between relevant 
regional bodies and international counterparts.
 4. Foster cross-regional humanitarian policy-
maker/science dialogue. There is an increasing 
number of events that bring together experts on a 
wide range of issues affecting vulnerability in the 
region. Most in one way or another makes inroads 
into information and knowledge requirements 
needed to develop greater understanding about 
the nature of hazards and possible solutions for 
addressing future crises. And yet, there are at least 
five major gaps in that much needed dialogue to 
date that should be narrowed: [i] greater efforts 
need to be made to share scientific information 
between and amongst countries in the region; 
[ii] policy-makers that have direct interests in 
prevention and preparedness as well as response 
need an accessible forum – including on-line 
capacities -- for inter-acting with natural and social 
scientists; [iii] a concerted effort is needed to have 
such a forum focus on the interactive nature of 
possible threats on a regional level; [iv] greater 
attention needs to be made by scientists and policy-
makers to make the practical outcomes of their 
work accessible to threatened communities; and [v] 
greater attention needs to be given to strengthening 
appropriate scientific and humanitarian research 
capacities in the region.
5. Address knowledge gaps and coordination for 
comprehensive research. Despite the extensive 
research undertaken on a range of hazards in the 
region, there remain many areas in which further 
research is required to develop effective prevention 
and preparedness approaches. The knowledge gaps 
and uncertainties have been touched upon in this 
report and in others. They range from the technical 
to the socio-cultural, and include the need for 
greater understanding about the effects of global 
activities, eg. food pricing, upon the vulnerabilities 
of local communities within the region. Towards this 
end, greater efforts need to be made through, for 
example, the forum proposed in Recommendation 4 
to identify critical knowledge gaps for collaborative 
research and research partnerships.
6. Promote innovation consortia. Related to 
Recommendation 4, a watching brief on the 
identification, prioritisation and implementation of 
scientific and technological innovations needs to be 
established, and geared towards identified problems 
in the region. This is not to ignore the fact that there 
are already a number of scientific and technological 
innovations that can address some aspects of 
possible future crises. This recommendation calls for 
more systematic approaches for identifying, testing 
and sharing innovation that is both obviously and 
potentially relevant to the mitigation needs of the 
region. Of particular importance in this context 
is working with local communities to identify 
innovative solutions that directly relate to local 
needs.
7. Initiative a vulnerability mapping exercise. A 
regional mapping exercise and system are required 
to identify and monitor those factors that could 
create humanitarian crises at local and regional 
levels. Towards this end, a platform to undertake 
this mapping exercise is needed, and the exercise, 
itself, should in the first instance focus on how 
such factors interact, their dynamics and probable 
dimensions of impact. Based upon this initial 
mapping exercise, a regional mapping system could 
be developed to ensure that key data and knowledge 
are regularly incorporated.. The ‘map’ itself should 
reflect details from specific urban and rural 
community levels to the wider regional context. It 
should be a key objective of the exercise and system 
to ensure that localised dynamics are incorporated 
into the regional framework which will also require 
deeper investigations into community resilience at 
the micro level because this can affect the severity of 
any future crisis scenario. 
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The following stories are not necessarily intended to 
approximate reality, but this approach can be used to 
challenge conventional thinking and to enable policy- 
and decision-makers to think ‘out of the box’. In this 
instance, however, the accounts that follow are not 
merely an exercise in exploring alternative approaches 
to policy formulation. While they are indeed intended 
to stimulate thought about how to deal with complexity 
and uncertainty, they also offer descriptions of the 
sorts of future crises that those responsible for crisis 
prevention and preparedness will have to consider.
China’s	water,	2020–2025:	scarcity,	
pollution	and	conflict	
Over the past decade, the Chinese government has failed 
to address underlying structural issues in domestic water 
allocation, develop adequate systems of water pricing 
and rights, curb waste or allow water trading. Instead, 
government response has been to rely on water-transfer 
projects and to limit water allocations to provinces, 
rather than to promote conservation through regulatory 
or market mechanisms. By 2020, unregulated economic 
activity and over-exploitation of limited or contaminated 
water sources had combined to push China’s water crisis 
into catastrophic proportions.
Groundwater tables under the northern plain have dried 
up, or at least sunk so deep that farmers are unable to 
extract the remaining water. Continued erratic rainfall 
and rising temperatures have rendered the Yellow River 
and its major tributaries seasonal resources. The Shiyang 
River in Gansu has completely disappeared. The oases 
of the northern plains are particularly reliant on glacier 
meltwater, and many, like that of Minqin County, have 
been completely evacuated. The early 2020s saw the 
water availability per person in the Hai, Huai, and Yellow 
(Huang) river basins fall well below 500m
3
/year, less 
than the minimum for human existence. In this former 
breadbasket, desertification continues to overwhelm 
arable land. Dwindling glaciers have caused the Gobi 
desert to encroach further upon the oases in the Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region. Desertification now affects 
600 million people, nearly half the country’s population.
Policies of state-directed environmental migration have 
now relocated 3 million farmers and nomadic herders 
in Qinghai, Ningxia and Gansu to Xingjiang and Inner 
Mongolia. This is having enormous environmental and 
social repercussions since these now-arid destinations 
themselves are unable to provide adequate support 
for increasing populations and there is not enough 
arable land for migrants to sustain new livelihoods. 
Ethnic tensions have been escalating in China’s western 
hinterlands, with increasing violence. These incidents 
culminated in a series of savage riots that spread from 
Hohot, Lhasa and Urumqi throughout urban centres in 
the region in June 2020. 
Conflict driven by water stress
As the summer of 2020 progressed, severe droughts, 
worse even than in 2019, threatened to drive the 200 
million inhabitants of the North China plain into 
potential starvation, and the army is enforcing water 
rationing in the overrun cities of Beijing and Tianjin. In 
the run-up to the National People’s Congress in October 
2020, the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced the 
launch of the construction of the western section of the 
South–North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP), aimed 
at increasing crop production in the Gobi desert and 
easing over-crowding in the east. In an attempt to gain 
popular support as the national water crisis accelerated, 
the Chinese leaders disregarded international agreements 
and abandoned any effort to carry out an Environmental 
Impact Assessment – despite the serious pollution 
associated with construction of the central section of the 
project. 
India–China relations have been at an all-time low 
since the completion of the 40,000MW dam at the 
‘Great Bend’ of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River in 
2019, harnessing the power of the deepest canyon in 
the world. This far exceeds the scale of projects such 
as the Three Gorges Dam, and the Indians claim that 
maximum river flow has already been reduced by 
20%, while the Chinese refute such accusations. On 1 
October 2025, Chinese National Day, Chandra Singh, 
the Indian President announced that, unless China 
discontinued water-transfer plans, India would make an 
official declaration of war. In the first weeks of October, 
India deployed an extra 60,000 troops in the border 
area and strengthened air defence in Ladakh. Seemingly, 
uncontrolled skirmishes broke out between troops 
on the border, resulting in casualties on both sides. 
Chinese internal conflicts over water allocation and 
pollution were so widespread that the threat to national 
security provided a useful focus for the government as 
it aimed to encourage patriotic unity against a common 
enemy. 
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Chinese troops were deployed to quell rising dissent 
within Tibet about environmental damage caused 
by mega-infrastructure projects. Chinese nuclear 
missile deployment in Haiyun and Da Qaidam in 
Qinghai province was confirmed, but the international 
community remained powerless. No bilateral agreement 
was ever reached between India and China after 
the memorandum of agreement to share hydrology 
data in 2002 degenerated into a means for China 
to exhort payment from India in return for often-
dubious information. Attempts by NGOs to establish an 
international dialogue and roadmap towards a ‘benefit-
sharing’ agreement have failed, and the international 
community can only watch and wait.
In the face of these Chinese actions, India has pursued its 
own grand plans. By 2019 a canal had been constructed 
to move water from the upper parts of the Ganges, 
Yamuna and Brahmaputra Rivers westward, ending 
in the Luni and Sabarmati Rivers in Rajasthan and 
Gujarat. This diverts water away from the Ganges, a 
few kilometres from the India–Bangladesh border. The 
immense levels of construction along the river severely 
affected the flow of water downstream in Bangladesh. 
Stagnant reservoirs have led to high levels of toxic algae 
and bacteria that Bangladesh claims are now poisoning 
hundreds of thousands of people.
Destruction of ecosystems and livelihoods
In order to complete the western water-transfer route, 
China has also diverted water from the Lancang (Upper 
Mekong) River, and a series of 15 cascading dams 
has been completed. The 292-metre Xiaowan dam 
is now the world’s tallest, as high as the Eiffel Tower. 
The reservoir behind the dam has grown to 102 miles 
long. At the same time Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia 
have all been pursuing their equally destructive dam 
projects, violating international standards concerning 
both environmental and social issues. The Mekong River 
Commission dissolved in 2015, after failing to play any 
role in regional facilitation or to prevent dangerous dam-
construction projects.
Dramatic changes to the river’s unique cycle of flood 
and drought – the annual flood pulse – have wrecked 
the delicate ecosystem of the region. In the waters of the 
Mekong that used to sustain the world’s second-largest 
inland fishery, most fish species are now threatened 
with extinction and the 60 million people who use the 
river as a source of food or livelihood are struggling for 
survival. Cambodia’s great central lake, Tonle Sap, the 
nursery of the lower Mekong’s fish stocks, used to fill up 
in monsoon season with a fifth of the Mekong’s waters. 
In 2025 it has become barely seasonal, and the loss of 
livelihood pushes another 15% of Cambodians below 
the poverty line and endangers many more. 
On 7 September 2030, severe monsoon floods deluged 
1.4 million hectares of land in the Mekong Delta, 
affecting 14.2 million people in Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam. The Vietnamese government’s ‘living with 
floods’ programme of the 2010s, to resettle people 
living in vulnerable zones, has failed due to lack of 
funding. Thus 5.3 million people in An Giang, Dong 
Thap and Tien Giang provinces have been driven out of 
the Mekong and the Red River Deltas. Climate refugees 
have swelled the population of Ho Chi Minh City, and 
Cambodia attempted to shut its borders in panic. 
As regional dialogue reached a deadlock over dam 
building, there are no regional mechanisms in place 
to cope with a humanitarian disaster of this massive 
scale. Moreover, hugely expensive construction of dams 
and reinforcement of thousands of miles of dikes built 
after the Commission collapsed in Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam will exacerbate the disaster in its aftermath. 
Barriers inhibit the self-cleansing mechanism of rivers 
and trap millions of cubic yards of industrial waste, 
hundreds of thousands of tonnes of industrial rubbish, 
and millions of tonnes of pesticides and fertiliser from 
fish and shrimp farms. The livelihoods and lives of the 
approximately 30 million inhabitants of the Mekong 
Delta are under long-term threat. 
Mega-flooding	in	Bangladesh,	2028	
Introduction
The Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna Rivers converge 
in central Bangladesh to form the massive GBM delta, a 
region corresponding roughly to the Bengal Basin, and 
which occupies most of West Bengal and Bangladesh. The 
basin is mostly flat country, between the Himalaya to the 
north and the Bay of Bengal to the south, and is filled 
with kilometres of alluvial sediment that form one of 
the most productive aquifers in the world. The delta has 
a tropical monsoonal climate and receives 1–3 metres of 
rainfall per year, normally with extensive flooding. The 
low-lying and flood-prone GBM delta is predicted to be 
one of the world regions most susceptible to changes 
linked to climate warming. 
The GBM delta overall was home to 130 million people 
in 2000, with an additional 28 million predicted by 
2015.Such growth is also reflected in the mega-city of 
Dhaka, where population is predicted to expand from 
the current 14 million to 22 million by 2025. Within 
the Asian mega-deltas, the abstraction of groundwater 
is greatest in the GBM delta, which also experiences 
very severe arsenic contamination of its groundwater. 
Consequently, the lives of millions of people, many 
living in poverty, are already highly vulnerable. The 
scenario developed here illustrates how a number 
of factors interacting simultaneously may lead to a 
magnified disaster – a flood in this case. 
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A future for Bangladesh: increasing 
vulnerability 
The 2010s and 2020s were mixed for the people of 
Bangladesh. The population continued to grow, as did 
food production and inflation-adjusted per-capita GDP. 
Dhaka became the fourth largest city in the world as 
its population hit 22 million in 2025, and it remained 
the most densely populated city in the world. The 
growing population of the mega-city was partly due to 
in-migration from r ural areas, a trend seen throughout 
Asia. The population increase put great stress on the 
environment and its resources. Water remained the 
main focus of attention, with grave concern about the 
depletion of groundwater, which in many areas was 
being drawn down at a rate of over 1m per year and 
not annually recharged during the summer monsoon. 
Consequently, many sources of groundwater become 
unproductive, making farming impossible in many areas. 
The demand for domestic and industrial water in Dhaka 
and other cities has also grown fast.
The quality of groundwater remains problematic, despite 
nationwide efforts to introduce filtration systems. 
Severely affected communities have largely broken down, 
with women showing obvious signs of arsenicosis 
being shunned, and the birth rate declining as a result. 
Consequently, there are fewer young people to help 
sustain these communities. Starvation and suicide have 
become widespread. In coastal and estuarine zones, 
land and groundwater have become increasingly saline. 
The death of many mangroves in the Sundarbans has 
left much of the coastal zone highly vulnerable to storm 
surges. Loss of coastal habitat has also led to increased 
coastal erosion. Shrimp farming in many places has been 
decimated by increased salinity of surface water. Power 
supply in Khulna and other cities has become limited 
by the availability of fresh water to cool the boilers in 
power plants. 
After the climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009, 
Bangladesh was designated a ‘natural laboratory’ for 
scientists mapping and monitoring the impacts of 
climate change on low-lying regions. As temperatures 
continued to rise, and summer glacial meltwater flows 
increased, the summer monsoon became more variable 
and tropical cyclones and extreme rainfall events 
intensified. Flooding became more extensive, and sea 
level in the Bay of Bengal continued to rise faster than 
the global average. 
The flooding of 2028
The 2028 flooding in the GBM delta, mainly in 
Bangladesh, started off as nothing unusual, but 
culminated in a mega-flood, which developed over 
several weeks in August and September. After several 
months of severe drought, extremely heavy monsoon 
rains arrived later than normal. As the rivers swelled and 
broke their banks inland, an intense tropical cyclone 
developed in the Bay of Bengal. The storm made landfall 
on the night of 15 September and coincided with a 
rising tide. Winds reached up to 250km per hour and 
a storm surge up to six metres high pushed inland. 
As the river water and the surge met, water backed up 
and spread out to engulf vast area of land. Over the 
following days, an estimated 50 per cent of Bangladesh 
flooded, including many parts of Dhaka, and some 80 
million people were affected. From the air, the country 
looked like a drowned world and people could be seen 
crammed onto areas of raised land and floating on boats 
and pieces of debris. 
Hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the 
flooding died of starvation and disease in the days and 
weeks following the flood. Maintaining delivery of 
essential services was largely impossible, with hopelessly 
impaired communications and many power stations 
unable to function. Several other factors contributed to 
the severity of the flood. Reports indicated that Indian 
farmers or paramilitaries had opened many dam gates 
and barrages in order to prevent them from bursting 
as water levels rose. This periodic release of water led 
to flash flooding in some areas of Bangladesh. This was 
been compounded by high flows of meltwater from 
Himalayan glaciers. As the rate of glacier retreat has risen 
considerably since 2021, many reservoirs upstream of 
the GBM delta have been unable to hold the extra water 
in summer, especially given their reduced capacity due 
to silting. Across many parts of Bangladesh, land has sunk 
as a consequence of the over-abstraction of groundwater 
and many areas that once lay above the flood level were 
submerged in 2028. 
The scale of the flood and the continued high flow of 
water through the GBM delta meant that the floodwaters 
took well over two months to recede. People were 
therefore displaced and without food or clean drinking 
water for many weeks. They could not work and ran 
out of money. An entire harvest was lost across much of 
the country and much agricultural soil near the coast 
was saturated with saline water. Even the most basic 
sanitation facilities all but disappeared, and so clean 
drinking water was largely unavailable. Consequently, 
food shortages and waterborne diseases reached an 
unprecedented scale across much of the country.
Relief operations
Although the government had issued warnings of the 
flood and cyclone, it was completely unprepared for the 
scale of the disaster. Emergency supplies quickly ran out 
and there was no food, safe drinking water or medical 
supplies across much of the country. The Bangladeshi 
military mobilised, although naval and air force bases 
near the coast were badly damaged. The army divided 
its efforts between helping flood victims and patrolling 
the 3400km fence between India and Bangladesh. Some 
of the most desperate flood refugees opted to risk being 
shot by trying to escape Bangladesh through the fence 
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along the Indian border. In several instances, groups of 
thousands of Bangladeshis charged the fence, attempting 
to break it down. The Indian army regularly dispersed 
crowds by firing tear gas across the border.
National and international aid agencies poured relief 
into the country, but found it impossible to move food, 
water and medical supplies effectively. Water filtration 
kits were deployed to some areas in the hope that 
some communities could survive by purifying their 
own water. Aircraft and boats were required, as many 
roads and bridges had been destroyed or were still 
under water. Despite substantial international resources, 
starvation, dehydration and infections were widespread, 
and the death rate increased dramatically. Initial estimates 
suggested that well over one million people died during 
and immediately after the floods.
The aftermath
The people of Bangladesh are some of the most resilient 
to poverty, ill health, hunger, dehydration and disasters, 
especially floods, but the effects of the 2028 flooding 
were unprecedented. The massive cost in terms of 
lives, and damage to infrastructure and the economy, 
set back development in the country by two decades. 
Tension between India and Bangladesh remains high, 
with the Bangladeshis calling both for the removal of 
the fence between the two countries and for joint water 
management. India, however, continues to refuse either 
of these demands, despite international pressure, and the 
two countries have come close to war. In protest, several 
million Bangladeshis have established refugee camps 
along the border, and the UN has deployed peacekeepers 
there. The refugees have attempted to discard their waste 
on the Indian side of the fence in protest. To date, in 
2030, war has not been declared, but there have been 
several shooting incidents. 
The flood catalysed the international community into 
new climate talks, but still the rhetoric continued with 
no obvious long-term benefit for Bangladesh and 
similar regions. Bangladesh claimed environmental 
compensation from high-income nations but without 
success. There are national and international calls for the 
Bangladesh government to re-vegetate the coastal zone, 
but funding for this is absent.
Despite the renewed talks, and worldwide concern about 
the situation in Bangladesh, there are no significant 
new initiatives two years after the mega-flood. The 
other hard truth is that the demands of population and 
development growth in Bangladesh since the 1970s 
have permanently altered the environment and depleted 
its resources, pushing the country into a new era of 
increased vulnerability and poverty. Such is the severity 
of the enduring devastation that there have been calls 
to abandon many parts of Bangladesh. However, other 
countries have not agreed to accommodate the estimated 
50–100 million people who would have to re-locate. 
Ultimately, as before, the people of Bangladesh have been 
left to adapt to a situation that will probably worsen with 
time. They remain effectively fenced into a massive flood 
zone.

    
Humanitarian	Crisis	Drivers	of	the	Future	
Material from this report may be quoted or reproduced free of charge 
but with the acknowledgement of this report as the source. The 
Humanitarian Futures Programme would appreciate a copy of any work 
using material from this report.
The authors welcome any comments or questions on this report. Please 
contact:
Dr Randolph Kent, Director 
Humanitarian Futures Programme 
King’s College London, Strand Bridge House, 
138–142 The Strand 
London WC2R 1HH, UK
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7848 2869
Email: randolph.kent@kcl.ac.uk
The HFP is an independent policy research 
programme based at King’s College London.
